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U.S. Tank Corps'  
Humble Beginnings



THE MAGAZINE OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY

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## ON THE COVER

### World War I's Often-Overlooked Tankers: 301st Battalion Tamed Massive Machines

# 36

By Lt. Col. Robert Bateman, USA Ret.

Almost a third of the American men in the World War I tank corps who saw combat were trained by the British in their heavy tanks—massive rhomboidal monsters with multiple cannons and machine guns manned by crews four times the size of the little French-made tankettes that were the first U.S. tank units to fight in the war. These American fighting men who fought in the “lost battalion” of American World War I tankers were lost not on the battlefields of France but to the annals of history. This is the story of the 301st Battalion, U.S. Tank Corps.

**Cover Photo:** *The U.S. Tank Corps' 301st Tank Battalion gears up for action in St. Souplet, France, in October 1918.*

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## FEATURES

### The Power and Pitfalls of Gender-Specific Mentorship

By Maj. Kristyn Felix and  
Maj. Ebony Thomas

Women-specific issues are not the only basis for mentorship groups, but they can often take the forefront because it is much easier to address women's issues with other women. **Page 16**



### Time Is Now to Address Enemy UAS Threats

By Col. Liam Collins, USA Ret., and Maj. Gabriel Dearman

Diffusion of unmanned aircraft systems technology over the past decade means the U.S. military can no longer be confident that it owns the skies. U.S. troops lack both the technology and training to combat this growing threat. **Page 19**

### Back to the Future: Leaders for Next Decade Can Learn From the '80s

By Lt. Col. Greg Lane, USAR Ret.

Forty years ago this year, the Army was entering an incredible decade: the 1980s. The service underwent changes during those 10 years in which it saw no major combat, unlike in previous decades when wars made their marks. **Page 21**

### Photo Essay: Healing and Remembrance on Gold Star Peak

U.S. Army Photos by Sgt. Alexander Skripnichuk

Paratroopers with the 4th Brigade Combat Team (Airborne), 25th Infantry Division, paid tribute to their fallen brothers and sisters in arms by hiking up Gold Star Peak in Alaska. **Page 24**

### Catching Excellence: Brigade Works to Train Soldiers for EIB Test

By Command Sgt. Maj. Vincent Simonetti

Within the 2nd Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, at Fort Carson, Colorado, a chance to commit to a training opportunity like training and testing for the Expert Infantryman Badge is an opportunity to build a cohesive and disciplined unit. **Page 26**

### Current, Former Medical Personnel Take on COVID-19

By Maj. Gen. George Alexander, M.D., USARNG Ret.

One important question to ask during the COVID-19 pandemic is what role the U.S. military can play in the response. We must fight this disease with all available resources. **Page 28**





## FEATURES

### Command, Intelligence Failures Led to Battle of the Bulge

By Col. Gregory Fontenot, USA Ret.

The fact is, before the Battle of the Bulge, the U.S. and Allied high commands remained focused inward on their plans rather than on what their adversary might do. This has implications for soldiers today. **Page 30**

### Will the Real MacArthur Please Wade Ashore?

By Col. Cole Kingseed, USA Ret.

Despite the considerable passage of time, the narrative surrounding Gen. Douglas MacArthur's contributions to Allied victory in the Pacific remains as it was in 1945: conflicted. **Page 40**

### The Army and the Alamo: Quartermaster Use of Landmark Saved It From Destruction

By David McCormick

The U.S. Army's association with the Alamo in the mid-1800s is the reason the structure stands today. **Page 44**

### VA Seeks to Serve Female Veterans

By Col. Robin Neumeier

More women than ever are choosing the Department of Veterans Affairs for health care. Initiatives to attract and retain female veterans as patients include Women's Health Transition Training. **Page 47**

### Forecasting Future Fights: Army Braces for Complex, Uncertain World

By Rick Maze, Editor in Chief

A new report from the nonpartisan Rand Corp. attempts to look at the future of warfare and what it might mean for today's military. The report says nations often guess wrong about what lies ahead. **Page 49**

#### The Outpost

### Segregated Unit Wins at Yechon

By Lt. Gen. Daniel Bolger, USA Ret.

In the wake of Task Force Smith in Korea, senior officers figured the segregated 24th Regimental Combat Team would stumble. But with all other battalions committed, on July 20, 1950, the 25th Infantry Division sent the 3rd Battalion, 24th Infantry Regiment, forward to confront the North Koreans at Yechon. **Page 52**

#### Historically Speaking

### Planning for Deadly Germs Began Decades Ago

By Brig. Gen. John Brown, USA Ret.

The Army has had ample experience dealing with infectious diseases. Worldwide operations have exposed troops to many pathogens, and the service has had to address them at the tactical, operational, strategic and grand strategic levels of war. **Page 56**

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### Learn From the Past

I was at first taken aback by the headline on the April article by retired Col. Daniel Roper, as I thought it was a bit myopic: “Building for the Future Based on Battle for Baghdad.”

However, after reading the article thoroughly, I have to say I agree with Roper’s thesis. This report should be required reading for company grade and field grade officers. We hopefully will not fight another battle like the one for Baghdad. However, we must learn from it.

There were all kinds of mistakes in the prewar planning, mobilization and execution and in Phase IV. Read the report, study it and learn from it. We need to do the same thing about the Afghan campaigns.

When my generation came back from Vietnam, we were told at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in the fall of 1975 by none other than Gen. William DePuy, commander of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command: “Forget everything you’ve learned over the past 10 years. We’re going to teach you how to fight outnumbered on the plains of Europe and win!” That was it, no discussion of lessons learned or anything like that.

So, all of our institutional knowledge was cast aside. Lo and behold, some 30 years later, then-Lt. Gen. David Petraeus and his team at the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center had to resurrect our counterinsurgency strategy.

Don’t make the same mistake we made back then. Learn from the past.  
**Col. Rick Anderschat, USA Ret.**  
Cincinnati

### Nixon Dug Deeper

**Retired Brig. Gen. John Brown’s** April *Historically Speaking* article on the Cambodian incursion warrants expansion (“Cambodian Incursion Inflamed U.S. Public Opinion”).

From the time Norodom Sihanouk acceded to Cambodia’s throne at age 18, he was endlessly beset by enemies. The U.S., for example, sponsored an implacable foe of his regime, the

Khmer Serei. Desperate to keep his country safe from the ravages of war, Sihanouk changed titles and international alliances as often as others change socks. All for naught. On March 18, 1970, led by Marshal Lon Nol and Sihanouk’s longtime bete noire, Sisowath Sirik Matak, Cambodia’s National Assembly voted to depose him. These two ringleaders immediately ordered the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and Viet Cong (VC) out.

The NVA attacked the fledgling Khmer Republic’s constabularies, armed and unleashed the insurgent Khmer Rouge, captured large swaths of Cambodian territory and menaced Phnom Penh. On April 28, 1970, in an act of unbridled hubris, President Richard Nixon ordered U.S. forces to attack into Cambodia. On April 30, he announced the invasion on national TV.

NVA/VC depots were forward-clustered along the border where Cambodia penetrates into Vietnam. If U.S. and Army of the Republic of Vietnam (U.S./ARVN) strategy was to attack the shoulders of these penetrations, envelop the NVA/VC and destroy them, it was a failure.

The main U.S./ARVN assault in the south was delayed a day because the ARVN commander decided April 29 was not an “auspicious” day. In midattack, Vietnam’s president, Nguyen Van Thieu, ordered his commander to veer away up National Route 1 toward Phnom Penh where ethnic Vietnamese were being massacred by Cambodian nationals.

The main U.S./ARVN attack in the north, Task Force Shoemaker, did not commence until May 1. Encountering only delaying forces, its 15,000-man U.S. contingent lost just eight killed and 32 wounded in the first two days of fighting.

When the U.S. 2nd Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, came under fire from covering forces inside Snuol, a rubber plantation town at the nexus of major road networks, it pulled back, pounded the town with tank fire and airstrikes, and

gave the enemy time to melt away.

Neither U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, nor the State Department notified the Cambodian desk officer at the U.S. Embassy in Saigon in advance of the attack. The U.S. charge d’affaires in Phnom Penh learned of the cross-border attack over Voice of America. He passed the word to Lon Nol who, caught flat-footed, condemned the attacks as a violation of Cambodian sovereignty.

U.S. attackers could and should have entered Cambodia as liberators; not invaders. Cambodian peasants hated the Vietnamese. They would have volunteered to hunt down and help kill them. The main objective should have been the destruction of the 40,000 NVA/VC combatants. Most escaped unscathed. Rich caches of arms, ammunition and foodstuffs were seized by U.S./ARVN forces. But these were low-hanging fruit that were going to fall into U.S./ARVN hands no matter how botched the invasion.

Except for one major military engagement conducted by the Khmer Republic in 1971, which tangled with NVA divisions that should have been destroyed during the incursion, the Lon Nol government could never do anything beyond cling to existence. Had the Khmer Republic been allowed to fail at the outset, B-52 bomber sorties and an occasional cross-border attack by ARVN forces would have been sufficient to keep the NVA/VC at bay as U.S. units extricated themselves from Vietnam.

Nixon’s desire to support the Khmer Republic ignored the “Law of Holes”: “Nor would a wise man, seeing that he was in a hole, go to work and blindly dig it deeper.”

**Col. Alan Armstrong, USA Ret.**  
La Jolla, California

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### CORRECTION

A Commentary in the May issue contained an error in the headline. “Luck Carried Glider Pilot Through World War II” was wrong. Lee “Bud” Mitchum was an airborne infantryman sitting behind the pilot.



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# The Principles of Resignation: A Primer

By Lt. Gen. James Dubik  
U.S. Army retired

In an April 8 opinion piece published online by *The Hill* newspaper, the two authors questioned why no senior military leader had resigned in protest over the Navy's cases involving SEAL Edward Gallagher or the captain of the aircraft carrier Theodore Roosevelt, Brett Crozier. And in a June 3 post, the Lincoln Project called for both Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Gen. Mark Milley and Secretary of Defense Mark Esper to resign for "an egregious lapse in judgment."

Anyone who has read my book, *Just War Reconsidered: Strategy, Ethics, and Theory*, or the essays I've written on the subject of civil-military relations, or who has heard me speak knows I think both senior military and political leaders should have the option to resign as a matter of principle. In fact, I believe in some cases, principled resignation is a moral obligation.

Neither the opinion piece in *The Hill* nor the statement from the Lincoln Project, a political action committee fighting President Donald Trump's reelection, advances a proper understanding of resignation in the context of U.S. civil-military relations.

First, the essay in *The Hill* calls for resignation in protest. Senior civil and military leaders have experience in not having their recommendations followed or only partially followed. To resign in protest because one's advice isn't followed would be viewed as professionally immature. The stakes involved in consequential decisions are often significant. Those who participate in helping the final decision authority use that authority responsibly must be mature professionals, and the final decision authority must be able to count on that maturity in the rough-and-tumble dialogue that precedes and follows a major decision.



U.S. ARMY/LT. COL. JOHN HALL

Second, a call for resignation in a published opinion piece, as in both the essay in *The Hill* and the Lincoln Project statement, makes public what should be a private matter—private because the candor required in civil-military dialogue needs a protected space, and private because a decision to resign is a matter of individual conscience. Using the media to create a groundswell of support for a particular position is political behavior, not professional civil or military behavior. The Lincoln Project's statement specifically says, "the presence of the Secretary and Chairman at this ignominious event [Trump's June 1 photo opportunity at St. John's Episcopal Church] transformed them into political partisans." So would a public resignation.

Third, calling for resignation by anyone outside the participants makes an assumption that those on the outside understand the facts more than those with access to available information. Of course, that could be the case, but it would be the exception, not the rule.

Finally, and more to the point in Crozier's case, calling for resignation on April 8 was premature since the

investigation was ongoing. According to a May 27 post on USNI News, the Crozier investigation had only recently been handed over to the chief of naval operations for review. And in the case of the June 1 photo op, the details of how the chairman and secretary ended up on-site can be termed a "bait and switch" situation.

## Guiding Civil-Military Relations

The position I take is different. I advocate principled resignation, not resignation in protest. The latter opens the door to petulance; the former does not. Principled resignation starts with the recognition of three core principles that should guide civil-military relations in the United States:

- The Constitution assigns the right of final decision to the president, or in some cases, the secretary of defense. This principle guarantees civil control of the military, a bedrock of our democracy.
- All rights have corresponding obligations, however, and responsible use is the obligation that accompanies the right of final decision. The obligation of responsible use, in the U.S., is shared in two senses. First,

it is shared between the legislative and executive branches through the fundamental concept of checks and balances of coequal branches of government. Second, it is shared by those senior civil and military leaders who participate in the highest levels of dialogue leading up to a final decision and in the execution of and adaptations to decisions. This obligation avoids capricious use, increases the likelihood of final decision authority being properly used, and recognizes all American rights have limits, even those of a final decision authority.

- The fundamental principle each American, regardless of station or position, remains responsible for is their conscience and actions. Without such a belief, neither the Declaration of Independence nor the Constitution could have been written. Further, the Nuremberg trials validated the applicability of this principle to military officers and public officials. This principle also helps ensure that the American people are not served by moral automatons.

These principles—among others that one can identify only in the specifics of a particular case—are, or should be, at play during discussions leading up to consequential decisions. Also at play, and in an important way, are the facts of a particular case. Facts matter when one is trying to apply principles in order to arrive at a judgment—which is what a consequential decision is. And judgments are not empirical in the same way as solutions to a math or engineering problem.

### Ambiguous Situations

Those who have to make consequential decisions almost always do so in conditions of ambiguity, sometimes in the extreme. These decisions are never made with the benefit of hindsight. Dissenting opinions and reasonable alternate approaches are always present in such decisions. Further, consequential decisions are almost always dynamic sit-

uations where facts hidden at the time of an initial decision emerge later.

Last, the final decision authority as well as the senior civil and military leaders who serve that authority are always dealing with more than one important and pressing issue. Multiple, complex and important issues coexist. Decisions cannot be made based on a single-issue perspective because a decision in one area usually affects one or more others. Ambiguity, dissent, dynamism and complexity are four of the reasons a final decision authority is best served by a robust, often contentious set of discussions before a decision is reached as well as during execution so the initial decision can be modified to fit changing circumstances. A theory of principled resignation acknowledges these aspects of the decision-execution cycle.

### Maturity Required

A theory of principled resignation also realizes that the discussions necessary in making consequential decisions—often iterative with a final position emerging over time—are best not held in public. Among others, former Defense Secretary Robert Gates explains why protected space is critical to the civil-military dialogue in his book, *Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War*. The dialogue at the highest level also requires participants who are morally mature—that is, participants who not only will speak truth in the presence of power but also understand that they may be wrong. Participants must also be active listeners willing to question each other, be open to altering their views, and execute a decision that may be counter to the position they hold. Such a dialogue requires protected space.

Finally, a principled resignation approach holds that resignation is a last resort, not a first reaction. In almost every case, the preferred action is voicing one's position or opposition; trying to convince the final decision authority or other participants in the discussion—either before an initial

decision is made or after execution when some adaptation is necessary—to adopt a different approach.

### Risky Business

A principled resignation position acknowledges risks. The senior civil or military leader who resigns must expect some form of sanction, or even punishment. From Socrates on, there's plenty of historical precedent for being punished after acting according to one's conscience. Moral courage is not risk-free. But the individual senior leader is also at risk if they do not resign once arriving at the last resort.

Such a leader risks what Lewis Sorley quotes Gen. Harold Johnson, an Army chief of staff during the Vietnam War, in *Honorable Warrior: General Harold K. Johnson and the Ethics of Command* as saying: that he would go to his grave with a “lapse in moral courage on my back.” And there's also the personal risk of having one's moral conscience “slow-cooked,” for not only can power corrupt, but nearness to power can also.

There's risk to the nation, too. An America where its senior leaders always choose to “go along” is a country at risk. In an unqualified “go along” environment, the nation loses a critical recuperative mechanism. As Albert Hirschman observes in *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States*, if voice doesn't work, resignation may be the last chance to bring attention to the fact that something is, or may be, seriously wrong. “Exit,” or resignation, Hirschman goes on to say, “has an essential role to play in restoring quality performance of government ... the jolt provoked by [an] exit of a respected member is in many situations an indispensable complement to voice.”

### Consider Civil Control

Finally, there is the risk to civil control of the military. This risk is real, but often overblown. In the U.S., civil control of the military is set in law and tradition. The risk of an American military coup is so low that

A principled resignation position acknowledges risks.

it cannot be measured. If a senior military leader resigns as a matter of principle, then holds a press conference to air their grievances, however, that would be a direct challenge to civil control. Or if, as was the case at one point during the Vietnam War, all the joint chiefs considered resigning en masse, that would certainly be a threat to civil control. The resignation of one or two people, however, is a different matter. The strength of the U.S. civil control apparatus can easily withstand a resignation. Jim Mattis' 2018 resignation as secretary of defense is a case in point.

There are important principles involved in these calls for resignation. The principles of undue command influence and responsible use of final decision authority, for example, are involved in the Gallagher and Crozier cases. So are the principles of good order and discipline and the need to preserve an apolitical military. The Lincoln Project's call raises the

principle of an apolitical military by claiming the complicity of the chairman and the secretary in the photo op, which "undermines the faith of the American people in the armed forces of the United States and politicizes the defense of the nation." Esper's June 3 news conference and Milley's June 2 message to the joint force, however, refute the charges of complicity and clearly show how seriously both take their oath to support and defend the Constitution.

Adding these to the three core principles listed above, however, doesn't form a neat set. Principles never do, not in our private lives or in our professional lives. Principles often conflict with one another, one more reason why judgments lack the precision of a mathematical or engineering problem.

And yet another reason why any final decision authority—whether the president, secretary of defense or a field commander—needs others to help ensure a complete understanding

of the facts as well as a full airing of options, pros and cons, risks and mitigation measures before making a final decision.

Whether the Gallagher and Crozier cases or the discussion over the use of federal troops on American streets justify the principled resignation of senior civil or military leaders is a question worthy of answering. Maybe there are reasons for a "yes" answer. But neither stating that good order and discipline have been damaged therefore someone should resign, nor that a lapse in judgment requires resignation, provides that. ★

**Lt. Gen. James Dubik**, U.S. Army retired, a former commander of Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, is a senior fellow of the Association of the U.S. Army. He holds a doctorate in philosophy from Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, and is the author of *Just War Reconsidered: Strategy, Ethics, and Theory*.

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## RECENT PUBLICATIONS

# V Corps Could Serve Massive Role in Europe

By Lt. Gen. Michel Yakovleff  
French army retired

The Russian aggression in Ukraine in the summer of 2014 served as a wake-up call for NATO. The 2014 Wales Summit launched a full-scale reform of the alliance, including its military posture. For the first time in a generation, perennial calls for downsizing—the last reduction having been ordered as recently as 2012—have been reversed. NATO is upping its readiness in terms of organizational flexibility and responsive forces.

The U.S. has been at the forefront of the effort, with a significant reinforcement of forces in Europe, reversing the trend that started with the end of the First Gulf War in 1991. In concurrence with NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence, U.S. forces rotate and exercise through the Baltic States, Poland, Romania and Slovakia, and more generally conduct a persistent show-of-flag operation on the eastern side of the alliance.

America's latest decision to reactivate V Corps and assign it to the defense of Europe is a momentous event. The reactivation has great political and strategic significance, but it also raises questions about the corps' operational value and has implications for the rest of NATO.

## Clear Message

What is significant, politically, is the comparison between President Donald Trump's pronouncements regarding other members of the alliance and the hard facts on the ground. Trump's declarations about NATO have raised concerns. Nonetheless, a persistent, continuous, coherent strategy of reinforcement and forward basing is being implemented. If any interested observer (e.g., Russia) assesses America's actions on facts as opposed

to words, then the message is clear: America is getting stronger in Europe every day.

The U.S. is not reversing its "pivot" to the Pacific, for obvious reasons. Yet Europe is no longer a backwater, or a reservoir destined for other theaters. It is a joint, holistic effort, involving all services. The U.S. European Command in Stuttgart, Germany, is becoming a front-line command again, eschewing its long-standing role of purveyor of forces and capabilities to other commands, or providing rear-theater functions.

## Applying Pressure

Asserting its traditional role of leader of the West, America is applying pressure on its European allies to cough up more for their own defense. As a former French military member, I served a nation that never took it for granted that America would be presumed to sacrifice its own children for countries that were not ready to line up their own on their own border. This new pressure is welcome for all of Europe, though in all fairness, results so far are uneven. But at least the trend is there. Would this trend have been achieved only through political pressure from Trump on topics such as the fabled 2% of gross domestic product threshold? That is doubtful. More visible, more capable, more active U.S. military forces have sent home the message, via public opinion.

Reactivating an Army corps, based in America, is not of itself a visible act regarding public opinion in Europe. Yet it does have significant strategic consequences.

Let's assess its true military implications from a European military perspective.

Nominating a corps-level headquarters in view of a potential Euro-

pean contingency is an indicator of the degree and magnitude of the fight that America would be willing to join if necessary. That is a worthwhile message that is well understood by the potential adversary.

We must remember that NATO allies in Europe entertain nine High Readiness Forces (Land) headquarters such as the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps in Great Britain. Considering that the magnitude of American involvement of forces in Europe outshines the potential contribution of most countries, especially in the first days of a potential operation, it could easily be said there was a gap in U.S. Army architecture in Europe. Creating and forward-deploying an American equivalent to the European corps-level headquarters fills that gap by providing an alter ego to the High Readiness Forces (Land) headquarters.

The commander of Allied Land Command, NATO's premier land headquarters, is an American three-star general. At a time when the U.S. Army presence in Europe was, to say it politely, residual, not having a large American corps-level command was unimportant. Now that every NATO exercise involves a high proportion of U.S. Army forces, there is logic in providing an in-theater U.S. national equivalent to other NATO corps-level commands.

V Corps will certainly be endowed with high-end capabilities that few European armies have retained, and none with the same degree of completeness, in domains such as intelligence, deep fires and air defense.

## Strong Statement

V Corps' main headquarters and all corps-echelon fighting assets will likely remain stationed in the continental U.S., with its main headquarters at Fort Knox, Kentucky.



What will be visible in Europe will be V Corps' forward headquarters element, at a location yet to be determined. By fielding a specialized war-fighting capability at the corps level, with a sizable element permanently based in Europe, the U.S. makes a strong statement of intent.

Incidentally, having a forward headquarters as opposed to a full headquarters in Europe, beyond saving costs to the American taxpayer, allows for political flexibility because it is upwardly scalable. If circumstances call for political gesturing, increasing the forward component of the corps sends a discreet yet ominous message. This built-in flexibility may very well be fortuitous at this point in time, but could come in handy.

### Think These Through

Among others, there are two decisions that have yet to be made (or formulated): one, impacting the relationship with NATO, the other, human resources. These may appear technical in nature, yet both have major operational consequences. As a European member of the alliance, I call for these decisions to be well thought out.

The crucial decision relates to

the relationship V Corps (Forward) will have with the rest of NATO in Europe. There are two fundamental options, mutually exclusive: non-integration, in which case V Corps as a whole remains a "true blue" American entity in Europe, co-located but marginal; or integration in the High Readiness Forces (Land) construct, possibly with variations on the main theme, but still recognizable as such.

Let us explore both approaches. In doing so, I hope to contribute to the internal American debate.

The first option is, conceptually, the most obvious and the easiest to implement and operate. V Corps reports solely to its national chain of command, period. Its forward element may participate in NATO exercises, assist in NATO planning and so on, but in essence, it remains a bystander of its peers, the multinational High Readiness Forces (Land) headquarters of the NATO Force Structure. The main justification for such an option would be that the national chain of command presumes that all land forces operating in Europe, to include in an Article 5 scenario, would be assigned to V Corps and fight as an American force, give or take some temporary task-organization vagaries.

Remaining a bystander has obvious national advantages, not least in simplicity and operational effectiveness, which is not an illogical criterion when thinking of high-end warfare. Yet politically, it sends a contradictory message and, in the larger picture of a full-blown NATO war, it would create difficulties higher up the NATO chain of command.

The second option would have V Corps join the congregation of High Readiness Forces (Land) headquarters, albeit within the top of the range in view of its unique capabilities. This has massive implications. For example, would V Corps line up for the rotational functions under the NATO Response Force construct? In which case it would be presumed to adhere to the three-year cycle of certification planning and exercising, which is an onerous standard. In particular, it would have to work hard on interoperability with its other NATO friends, which is not easy when some of the capabilities you bring are so unique that no one else knows how to operate with them.

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Soldiers with the Field Artillery Squadron, 2nd Cavalry Regiment, train on an M777 howitzer in Germany.

U.S. ARMY/SPC. JAVAN JOHNSON

Integrating—possibly with amendments—into the NATO Force Structure would imply significant and repetitive requirements, but it also would reinforce the message of the alliance. Also, by participating fully in a number of exercises, it would create the kind of relationship and practice that can only be developed in peacetime. Not least with Allied Land Command, the champion of the land community within NATO.

### Building the Network

The second decision, related to human resources issues, could well be a natural consequence of the first. The main advantage of having a headquarters forward-deployed is to build the network. In practical terms, that calls for three-year deployments being the norm. But if that were the case for V Corps (Forward), then the discrepancy with Army officers serving under Allied Land Command in Izmir, Turkey, who are deployed for one year, could become problematic. Seen from the other NATO land friends, V Corps (Forward), by virtue of being full of Americans with a three-year tour, would have more memory and network value than the other American officers serving in Allied Land Command. Ultimately, V Corps (Forward) could become, unwittingly, a competitor for Allied

Land Command—at least its American “slice.” This may sound trivial, but it won’t be to many readers with experience concerning the NATO world.

Another human resources implication for V Corps if the integration route is followed would be its multinationalization. By nature, NATO Force Structure entities are multinational to a certain extent, their framework nation being the only main provider. In which case, V Corps would offer some positions to other allies, both at the forward headquarters but also, quite likely, at main headquarters. This is not unheard of within the U.S. Army, so there is no conceptual difficulty there.

It does imply reciprocity, and U.S. Army officers are serving within European-based High Readiness Forces (Land) headquarters. But the national chain of command would be well advised to think through the consequences of such a setup: reserving some meaningful slots for allied nations, possibly in the continental U.S. And hoping, by the way, that allied officers fill these slots.

### Clarification Needed

The decision to reactivate V Corps and forward-deploy part of its headquarters is a momentous decision, with high political impact, much more

than the figures would indicate.

But its position in the NATO Force Structure needs to be clarified: Will this corps be a bystander of the NATO force structure, living next door but otherwise only minimally involved? Or will it become a new component of the NATO Force Structure in its own right, albeit with adaptation? And secondarily, though by no means anecdotally, what relationship will it develop with NATO Allied Land Command, in view of the risk outlined above?

As a former French officer, having served under three Supreme Allied Commanders Europe during seven years with NATO, and as a true believer in NATO, I advocate for a true NATO role for V Corps, in the great tradition of its forebear. It would serve as a cultural bridge between the U.S. Army in the continental U.S. and its potential brothers in arms in case of conflagration in Europe. Its operational value would contribute massively to the restoration of conventional deterrence in Europe. ★

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**Lt. Gen. Michel Yakovleff**, French army retired, ended 40 years of service in the French army as a three-star vice chief of staff at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe. He served under three Supreme Allied Commanders Europe from 2009 to 2016.

# Mentoring Moments Can Last a Lifetime

By **Lt. Col. Chad Storlie**,  
U.S. Army retired

The goal of leadership in the Army is to improve the performance of the organization to fulfill its assigned missions while simultaneously improving the capabilities of the leaders assigned to fulfill those vital missions. Mentoring is the most common day-to-day vehicle that develops Army leaders into better leaders.

For mentoring to be successful,

three essential components must be present simultaneously. First, a leader must be willing to share their knowledge in a way someone can understand. Second, another leader must understand they have more to learn about their profession, and must be willing to learn from the person supplying information. Third, it takes an understanding that real-life mentoring consists not of classes, not of coaching sessions, and not of hourlong conversations. Instead,

great mentoring consists of impactful moments when teaching, learning and immediate understanding come together.

There are two misconceptions that derail mentoring. The first is that effective mentoring must be a long-term and ongoing relationship to be effective to a career or leadership style. Current time and mission requirements make this an antiquated form of mentoring that today’s Army leaders cannot real-



istically achieve. Army leaders and subordinates instead must think of mentoring moments. A mentoring moment is a powerful teaching point delivered in a critical moment that emerges as a critical and viable teachable moment. The second misconception is mentoring is assumed to be from superior to subordinate, where a leader instructs their subordinate how to improve.

In my career, I received as much or more subordinate to superior mentoring from soldiers I formally led. Subordinates can teach as much as a superior.

Following are eight mentoring moments that had an impact on how I led—and still lead—others. These were vital mentoring moments because they were small fragments of time in my Army career that had an outsized impact.

### Do What Your Soldiers Do

1990 was a difficult year to be in the 2nd Infantry Division in South Korea. The Army was deploying into Saudi Arabia to fight Operation Desert Storm. While this was going on, my platoon sergeant, who I remember only as Sgt. 1st Class Moore, cared just about training. Sun, rain, snow, day, night and every possibility in between, Moore had the platoon shooting, road-marching, drilling and maintaining to be ready to fight.

Moore charged the squad leaders with training me to do everything the soldiers could do. I performed daily maintenance on the M106A2 mortar carrier vehicles, took the 4.2-inch-mortar gunner's exam, positioned the sections for firing with the aiming circle, stood by the crews when they slid a misfire out of the tube, and cleaned the M2 .50-caliber machine gun alongside the soldiers. Moore emphasized that leaders must not only be seen, but they also must be seen doing the same tasks alongside their soldiers.

### Great Plans Are Simple Plans

In Korea in 1991, I was the mortar platoon leader, and I had the opportunity to frequently see Maj. Daniel Bolger, the battalion operations officer, up close. One of the great points that Bolger emphasized was the importance of simplicity to get the battalion working quickly and effectively together. In August 1991, the battalion was going through an evaluation and received a fragmentary order to conduct a battalion movement to contact. In about 30 minutes, Bolger produced a single-page matrix operations order that clearly, simply and effectively illustrated the battalion movement to contact. Bolger's prompt, effective and simple order allowed not only an effective battalion operation, but also

was a lifelong reinforcement for me on the vital importance of simplicity in the orders process. [Retired Lt. Gen. Bolger is a contributing editor to *ARMY* magazine.]

### Subordinates Always Deserve Your Best Work

I was mobilized out of the Maryland National Guard to become a lead planner for the 5th Special Forces Group at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, for the invasion of Iraq in 2003. I first met Col. John Mulholland when I was presenting him with the group's plan during a major command post exercise in December 2002. The briefing I presented was not my best, and Mulholland let me know it. Over three painstaking hours of feedback, he told me what I missed, what would not work, and what I had not considered. At the end of his after-action review, Mulholland said, "Never forget: Your subordinates, who you are sending into the fight, always deserve your best work." A year later, after the invasion and after planning hundreds of missions, I never forgot to remember that I was not planning for Mulholland, but I was planning for

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Sgt. Devin Lewis, left, is mentored by Maj. Hollis Gaynor in Kuwait. The soldiers are with the 30th Armored Brigade Combat Team, North Carolina National Guard.  
NORTH CAROLINA NATIONAL GUARD/LT. COL. CINDI KING

hundreds of Special Forces soldiers and other special operations elements on the ground and in combat.

### **Be Ready When You Are No Longer the Best**

I loved my time as a rifle company executive officer in the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault). Lots of time in the field, lots of time shooting and lots of time for physical training. Running and obstacle courses were some of my favorite things to do, followed by time at the pullup bars behind the company area. More than once, Lt. Col. David Petraeus, the division operations officer, and I would have a pullup contest. After one of my close losses, Lt. Col. William Taylor III, my battalion commander, came to me and said, "Soon in your career, you will no longer be the best. Be ready to work even harder." Taylor's words echoed in my head through the Infantry Officer Advanced Course, Special Forces Assessment and Selection, the Special Forces Qualification Course and my time on my Special Forces team. The soldiers I led and my peers were not just good, they were damn good. True to Taylor's words, I tried even harder, worked harder, and became a better leader worthy of my soldiers' efforts.

### **Advance Your Profession**

I never met retired Lt. Col. Russell Eno in person. But between 1991 and 1994, Eno, who is editor of *Infantry* magazine, and I exchanged a series of letters as I struggled to write my first professional article. In one of Eno's first letters, he asked me bluntly, "What are you doing to advance your profession?" Eno's point, written on *Infantry* magazine stationary from a reliable typewriter, drove the point home that I needed to change my focus from "me" to "we." Gone were paragraphs about me, replaced with paragraphs on the importance of "Sergeant's Time" and how to grow junior Army leaders. I have never forgotten Eno's patient coaching, subtle editorial remarks, consistent enthusiasm and driving focus that I needed to do more to improve the Army.

### **Enable Subordinates With Overwhelming Trust**

I first met Maj. John Fenzel in Russian language class in 1995 at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, as we struggled to learn the Cyrillic alphabet and pronounce difficult Russian military phrases. After class, Fenzel went to Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and I went to the 10th Special Forces Group to begin my career as a Special Forces team leader. My time as a team leader was consumed with deployments to and from Bosnia as part of NATO's peace-keeping/peace enforcement mission. When I returned from my first deployment in Bosnia to Fort Carson, Colorado, in 1997, I met my new company commander. It was Fenzel. He and I had about six weeks together before my next deployment to Bosnia. One of the first things he said to me was, "We are new working together, but I trust you, no matter what. Get out there and do great work." In an instant, Fenzel established trust, confidence and candor between leaders. Mutual trust between subordinates and leaders is rare. Fenzel's overwhelming trust in me and my Special Forces team stands as an example of what Army leaders must do during deployments and complex operations.

### **Get Out and See Everyone, Every Day, Everywhere**

I worked with two amazing first sergeants, Jim Thompson and Jim Keen, during my time as a support company commander at Fort Carson in 2000. Both Thompson and Keen excelled at unceremoniously kicking me out of my office to the motor pool, drop zone, arms room, supply room, dining facility and everywhere in between to see as much of the company as I could each day. Keen had me get as many vehicle licenses as I could so there would be another driver in the company. The company awarded me the Driver and Mechanic Badge, an award I still cherish. Gaining critical insight from behind a desk is rare, but gaining critical insight talking to soldiers doing their daily jobs is a daily occurrence. Thompson and Keen pushed me to understand that what I needed to

know was not in my office but with the soldiers and what they did.

### **Think About What's Best for the Army**

About two years into my time as a Special Forces team leader, I began to plan for my dream to teach at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, New York. I took the GRE graduate school entry exam, was accepted into a doctorate program in history at Cornell University, New York, and networked extensively with the West Point faculty to gain their consideration. Finally the day approached, and I received my decision letter from the Special Forces branch. The letter, beautiful in its simplicity, said I was rejected from teaching at West Point. I became a battalion staff officer and commanded a battalion support company, spending just under five years at 10th Special Forces Group. Years later, in 2003 in Kuwait, I was a lead planner for a Special Forces task force working on the invasion of Iraq. After watching me brief the task force's plan for the invasion, a Special Forces colonel I didn't know said, "I bet you're glad you didn't go to West Point." That colonel had turned me down for West Point, but the Army was better for it. All my time in a Special Forces group was my best preparation for my role in Iraq as a ground planner.

Challenges for the Army and its leaders are vast, complex and unending. Army leaders at all levels need to constantly invest in mentoring moments at all levels, mentoring that reflects the challenges of moving up in responsibility but also understands the complexity and challenges subordinates face. Mentoring and developing leaders, with teaching from leaders and subordinates alike, creates the leaders and the leadership style the Army needs to meet future challenges. ★

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**Lt. Col. Chad Storlie**, U.S. Army retired, is an adjunct professor of marketing, a midlevel marketing executive, and the author of *Combat Leader to Corporate Leader: 20 Lessons to Advance Your Civilian Career*.



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# Charismatic Leadership Covered Failures

By Col. Charles Allen  
U.S. Army retired

A few years ago, I heard a senior Army officer lament that the then-Army chief of staff had to deal with congressional inquiries on sexual assault and sexual harassment. The concern was that the chief had more important issues to address, whereas sexual assault prevention was a distractor.

I've also heard of military folks contesting or disputing the statistics, estimates and findings of studies addressing Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention.

Likewise, some commanding officers and other leaders will contend that such bad behavior occurs in other units and organizations—not in their own, of course. I'd like to share my story to show that while leaders may be satisfied with organizational performance, it is important to pay attention to the climate experienced by service members and civilians.

In the late 1990s, I assumed command of an Army garrison in Europe. The base support battalion was responsible for enabling the missions of its operational units and tenant organizations, and caring for soldiers, civilians and their family members, as well as military retirees in the surrounding communities. As a field artillery officer, I sought to learn about the supported activities and our German hosts. It was a steep learning curve.

My focus was outside the base support battalion as an organizational unit as I embarked on the

90-day assessment. I felt fortunate to have a strong operations section, composed of soldiers and civilian employees, which had a reputation for solid planning, coordination and execution of community-support missions. The section was led by an officer who ran a tight ship, and when I ventured into his offices on the opposite side of headquarters, the staff was always focused and hard at work. I was glad that this was one of the areas I didn't have to worry about.

## Trouble Arises

One evening, my wife prompted me to talk to the personnel NCO. She wouldn't say why or what it was about. I had the good sense to take her cue. The NCO did not feel she could approach me directly, but trusted my wife to do so. When we met, the NCO expressed concern about a civilian employee in the operations section, and how she was being treated by the operations officer.

After a series of initial inquiries and a formal Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 fact-finding investigation, we discovered an inappropriate relationship and hostile work environment within the operations shop, as well as conduct unbecoming an officer since the operations officer was engaged in outside activities.

The AR 15-6 investigation also revealed a pattern of behavior, to include sexual misconduct, that extended across prior assignments. It seems that because he was a "good, sharp officer who got things done" and was well-liked, he was allowed

to move on to the next unit and the next series of victims.

## Just Down the Hall

The operations officer's actions took place just down the hall from my office, and I was unaware of them. In hindsight, it was clear that the operations staff of officers, NCOs and civilians felt trapped within the climate and dared not say anything because of the favored status of the officer.

I did not know who or whether anyone else in the headquarters knew about the hostile work environment or the misconduct. Perhaps the climate felt by unit members perceived the leader (me, as well as my predecessor) focused more on what got done rather than how things got done.

More than 20 years later, I still ask myself a series of questions I think will also be posed by U.S. Army War College students during our seminar discussions and by Army leaders (uniformed and civilian) in myriad operational and institutional organizations. The most important question may be, "What, if anything, has changed over the past two decades?"

A friend and colleague offered another. "What role will [Army War College graduates] play in creating the environment and climate to create the trust necessary to be more aware and ensure proper actions to hold predators, bad actors [and ourselves] accountable?"

It may be that the discourse of addressing these questions will be more relevant than the answers. ★

Col. Charles Allen, U.S. Army retired, is professor of leadership and cultural studies in the Department of Command, Leadership and Management at the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.

While leaders may be satisfied with organizational performance, it is important to pay attention to the climate experienced by service members and civilians.

# This Major Is Serving Using Brains and Brawn

*Maj. Allison Brager always wanted to serve in uniform, but first she spent 15 years becoming a neuroscientist and then she wrote a book on the human brain's performance. After those achievements, the Army offered her a direct commission. The 35-year-old has been serving for three years. In her current assignment as a CrossFit competitor on the U.S. Army Warrior Fitness Team, part of a recruiting outreach program, she talks with young people and tells them how she merged her background in science with soldiering. Brager, who spent eight weeks in New York City at the height of the COVID-19 crisis, is also looking toward outer space.*

## 1. What was your work for the Army before the direct commission?

I was a research scientist at the Walter Reed [Army] Institute of Research [in Bethesda, Maryland]. I was there on a National Academies of Sciences fellowship to further look at this issue of caffeine sensitivity under sleep deprivation, mostly how one's genetic landscape or DNA profile could alter one's sensitivity to sleep deprivation, but also the ability of caffeine to keep an individual awake under sleep deprivation. So that's always been my background, behavioral genetics. After I commissioned, I became the chief of the Sleep Research Center at the Center for Military Psychiatry and Neuroscience at Walter Reed.

## 2. Why hadn't you commissioned during college?

I was recruited for track and field by all the [Ivy League] schools and [the U.S. Military Academy at] West Point [in New York], but my parents wouldn't let me go because that was the year we went to war. I actually started Officer Candidate School with the Marine Corps in college, but I had a foot injury my sophomore year, so I had to disenroll. After that, I was like, "Well, I tried. Looks like I'll never serve." [At Walter Reed] they said, "You can wait for a [civilian] position to open up or you can have some stability right now and direct-commission." It was offered as job stability, but I saw it as something entirely different — a second chance.



## 3. Have you been on any overseas deployments?

We did [a] study to track sleep patterns of [soldiers] at Camp Buehring in Kuwait. We were there for about a month. The soldiers would do various marksmanship training exercises, and those were really interesting for us because over there, those guys are basically staying awake for 48 hours straight, so it really let us look at relationships between time awake and what we call combat effectiveness.

## 4. Is it weird to be a scientist working at U.S. Army Recruiting Command?

This is a special broadening assignment, and I really see myself more as a scholar-athlete. I'm a 71 Foxtrot, which means my area of concentra-

tion is research psychology, even though I've taken few psychology classes in my life. There are other neuroscientists like me, like five of us. We call ourselves the unicorns of Army medicine.

## 5. How do you recruit people?

We go out and compete, and afterward we go into a high school or a college ... and we make sure these kids know they can actually utilize their [science, technology, engineering and math degrees] for the benefit of the Army. If you would've asked me if the Army had doctors, I had no idea. I had no idea that the Army has scientists, let alone molecular biologists and microbiologists. So that's really what I see my role as, trying to get as many STEM people as possible into the Army.

## 6. How did you end up in New York?

The [fitness] team went to a virtual environment [during the pandemic]. That was OK at first, but then I volunteered to go to New York. I was one of the officers in charge of the lab at the Army field hospital at the [Jacob K. Javits Convention] Center, which was literally run out of a shipping container.

## 7. Do you have your next move planned?

I'll probably go back to Walter Reed and be a branch chief there, although I am working with one of the sergeants major here [at Recruiting Command] to apply for the astronaut program. —Gina Cavallaro ★

Maj. Allison Brager.

U.S. ARMY

# The Power and Pitfalls of Gender-Specific Mentorship

By Maj. Kristyn Felix and  
Maj. Ebony Thomas

**M**entorship is a critical investment tool that should be used to cultivate the strength and diversity of the Army.

To sustain the talent of a workforce, organizations invest in their people through formal and informal mentorship. The Army thrives because of its diversity of talent, and mentorship is critical to ensure diverse leaders within the ranks.

The Army defines mentorship as “a voluntary and developmental relationship that exists between a person with greater experience and a person with less experience, characterized by mutual trust and respect.” Successful and experienced military leaders take time to personally develop subordinate leaders to ensure the next generation of leaders is ready.

Mentorship is not based on gender, but on experience and skills. This implies that mentorship is a tool that should be used for development that promotes continuity of an institution and values that transcend differences of gender, race and national origin.

Is there a need to have formalized female group mentorship programs in this era of the Army? In this article, we will discuss the pros and cons of gender-specific mentorship. The viewpoints are organized around three topics: gender-specific topics, inclusion and trust.

## Gender-Specific Topics

Women-specific issues are not the only basis for mentorship groups, but they can often take the forefront because it is much easier to address women’s issues with other women. There are issues men will never go through, such as menstruation, pregnancy, postpartum depression, hair regulations and



others. New mothers have professional and personal hardships that are not easily understood by men. Intangibles such as postpartum depression or the changes the female body goes through after pregnancy might not be easy to talk about with men. Almost instinctively, women are able to help other women.

While gender-specific groups provide a safe space to discuss personal issues, they also promote segregation in the Army and allow soldiers to remain ignorant of others’ issues. Soldiers react to uncomfortable situations differently, and their reactions may cause a rift between them. Male and female soldiers should learn how to communicate with each other regardless of the topic. This is a must on the battlefield, in training and in everyday garrison operations.

If male and female soldiers do not build trust from the beginning, it can be disastrous in combat. Discussing topics that might be uncomfortable for the opposite sex can also be a great learning tool. The discussions will inform decisions in their present and future positions and build candor and empathy in senior leaders.



## Inclusion

Women face unique challenges in the military and often have no one to discuss them with. Gender-specific mentorship groups provide an outlet for women who need assistance or guidance who don’t feel comfortable addressing their issues with men. Professionally, women in the Army are at a disadvantage because there are fewer women than men in almost every duty station and unit. Discussing hardships with someone who does not understand what you are going through can be tough. A woman might bring up what she perceives to be a sensitive issue and a man might brush it off as a minuscule issue. While nei-

ther side is at fault, there is a difference of opinion.

This difference could lead to more hardships for a woman. An example that many women have encountered is going back to work after having a child. There are many intangible issues that arise when a mother is separated from her child that men do not necessarily relate to. While this is a huge issue for women, men could easily brush it off because they might not understand. If the same issue was brought up in a gender-specific mentorship group, it could be discussed openly, and positive solutions could come out of the meeting.

For some, there is a negative connotation surrounding the report of a Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention (SHARP) incident. By reporting, younger women might think they will be labeled in a negative way. Some of the biggest hurdles women face in the Army are SHARP- and equal opportunity-related. Women relate to women on these subjects because they have a basic understanding of how a situation is created and all the issues that surround it. Often, senior female leaders are able to use their experience and knowledge to influence how younger women think about how women are perceived. When it comes to sexual assault and harassment, women are capable of arming other

Gender-specific mentorship groups provide an outlet for women who need assistance or guidance who don't feel comfortable addressing their issues with men.

**Clockwise from opposite top:** Sgt. Roxanna Villamizar, a maintenance team supervisor with the 1st Cavalry Division, works on an M88A2 Hercules recovery vehicle engine at Fort Hood, Texas. Staff Sgt. Erica Myers climbs a rope during the 5th Security Force Assistance Brigade's assessment and selection process at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington. Spc. Makaela Rodriguez, of the Iowa Army National Guard's 294th Medical Company Area Support, operates a lane at a COVID-19 test site in Cedar Rapids.

U.S. ARMY/STAFF SGT. CHRISTOPHER HAMMOND. DoD.  
ARMY NATIONAL GUARD/CPL. SAMANTHA HIRCOCK



women with tools to combat this type of behavior.

On the other hand, promoting gender-based mentorship groups implies women in the Army are not seen as equals or integrated. It is important to continue to push the limits of integration so women do not retreat into separation and segregation.

In 2015, a case study on gender integration by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Analysis Center concluded that women should be integrated into combat arms jobs and units. By 2016, women were integrated into combat arms jobs. The Army continues to move in a positive direction; separate but equal in actions and deeds demonstrates an antiquated mindset, promotes gender bias, and does not promote inclusion and togetherness, which ultimately undermines trust.

## Trust

At times, men and women have different problems best addressed by someone who understands from their point of view. Gender-focused groups enable discussions to focus on the finer details of what it means to be a man or woman in the Army. For many women, it is much easier to discuss professional and personal issues with other women. No woman wants to portray weakness to the team, which makes female to female mentorship an absolute must for those who are looking for help.

While men and women fill the same positions in the Army, women make up just 15% of the service. Women in gender-specific mentorship groups can relate to each other's professional and personal hardships and address gender-specific issues and perceptions that arise in the Army. In 2013, a brigade commander at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, started a gender-specific mentorship program because he felt more comfortable with women addressing women's issues. This is

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Chief Warrant Officer 2 Cheyenne Krynauw, an Apache pilot with the 4th Combat Aviation Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, Fort Carson, Colorado, is one of the few female pilots in her unit.

U.S. ARMY/PFC. ASHTON EMPTY



a pragmatic way of mentorship. The brigade commander knew he wasn't able to provide mentorship at the level the female soldiers needed, so he enlisted the assistance of female senior leaders. On the other hand, Army Regulation 600-100: Army Profession and Leadership Policy states, "Trust is the bedrock of our profession." There are plenty of ways to develop leaders through mentorship, but an all-female or all-male group mentorship program might reinforce negative perceptions and biases of gender, hinder professional development and diminish trust. The exception to gender-focused group mentorship is for initial entry trainees. It is probable that their values and norms may not initially align to Army organizational culture. Gender-based mentorship helps inculcate and transition young soldiers into the Army. Without trust, there is no profession.

The Army must have a progressive mindset and a culture of trust to win our nation's wars. In 1948, President Harry Truman's Executive Order 9981 integrated military services based on race. That same year, Congress passed the Women's Armed Services Integration Act granting women permanent status in military service. These presidential and congressional initiatives required racial and gender barriers be removed within the American military. To promote gender-based mentorship groups implies we are no better than we were before 1948. It is important to continue to push the limits of integration so the Army does not retreat into separation. The Army must see women as equals and allow people to choose how they want to be mentored.

All soldiers and leaders need access to professional and personal support in order to advance their professional and personal goals. This support may be tailored as a group for a gender or other specification such as race or national origin. Mentorship is a personal topic, and it's not "one size fits all." As your career progresses, you will have different needs, and the way you receive and give mentorship will change. The time and resources you commit to gender-specific groups, or not, is up to you.

Being part of a mentorship group is an individual choice and must be treated as such. Friends and colleagues will most likely have a different perspective on mentorship, and that is OK. Mentorship is about developing yourself and those around you. The goal is to ensure both men and women have a safe space to discuss issues, challenge critical thinking skills and progress as leaders.

Regardless of your choice to join or not join a gender-specific mentorship group, it is your choice. ★

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# Time Is Now to Address Enemy UAS Threats

By Col. Liam Collins, U.S. Army retired, and Maj. Gabriel Dearman

**O**n Sept. 14, unmanned aircraft systems attacked two Saudi Arabian oil production sites. The damage to the processing facility at Abqaiq and the Khurais oil field disrupted the refinement of 5.7 million barrels of crude per day, roughly 5% of the world's oil supply. Oil prices spiked by more than 14% in record-breaking one-day percentage gains.

The damage demonstrated the impact that an unmanned aircraft system (UAS) attack could have on the world's economy. These gray zone attacks also risk sparking a regional war and pulling the U.S. into the conflict. The day after the attack, President Donald Trump tweeted that the U.S. was "locked and loaded."

For the bulk of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Army's air defense warning level was white, meaning "an attack by hostile aircraft or missile is improbable." Troops never worried about attacks from the air. The only time they had to worry about looking up was in urban or mountainous terrain, and they weren't looking for enemy aircraft; they were looking for ground elements at a higher elevation. Much has been written about how the return to great-power competition means the U.S. military can no longer be confident that it owns the skies. Diffusion of UAS technology over the past decade makes this increasingly true, even against relatively unsophisticated foes.

During a recent visit to Saudi Arabia, it became clear how much the proliferation of UAS capabilities has affected security in the Middle East. Similar effects on regional security can be seen elsewhere, including Europe, which became apparent during



earlier visits to Ukraine. Afghanistan and Iraq, where both authors of this article have operational experience, have also seen conflict dynamics increasingly shaped by UAS activity. Of note, UASs are used for both reconnaissance and lethal purposes, and this dispatch restricts its focus to their lethal use.

Recent UAS attacks include the following:

**Saudi Arabia:** Houthi insurgents in Yemen, who have been fighting a war against a Saudi-led military coalition since 2014, claimed responsibility for the September attack on the oil facilities. While the use of UASs by Houthi rebels is not new, the sophistication, range (more than 1,000 kilometers from Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen) and precision suggest Iran's direct involvement. Indeed, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo blamed Iran for the attacks. Previous UAS attacks by the Houthis have been carried out with the Samad 3, an inexpensive, slow and unsophisticated suicide UAS with minimal loiter time. Based on the analysis of evidence recovered at the strike sites, it is likely that the more so-

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phisticated Quds-1—a larger UAS with a payload similar to that of a cruise missile—was used.

**Ukraine:** Ukraine, which is in an ongoing armed conflict with Russian-backed separatists, is facing similar UAS attacks under cover of proxy forces. In September 2017, UASs reportedly dropped incendiary munitions on an ammunition depot in Vinnytsya, some 700 km from the conflict zone. While it is unclear where the aircraft originated, the attack nonetheless demonstrates the vulnerability of rear areas to UAS strikes. This attack on one of the Ukrainian army's largest ammunition depots was one of several similar attacks carried out that year. Russian-backed

A soldier with the 173rd Airborne Brigade releases a Raven small unmanned aircraft system during training in Italy.

U.S. ARMY/PFC. ANDREW WEBB BUFFINGTON

groups such as the Donetsk People's Republic have used sophisticated Russian-made UASs, including the Orlan-10, to carry out sabotage operations against targets in Ukraine. Indeed, when Steven Pifer, the former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine, asked how the U.S. could help, Ukrainian commanders requested jamming equipment and radar to intercept Russian-made UASs.

**Syria and Iraq:** While the use of UASs by insurgents and proxy forces is not new, the ubiquity of UASs makes them an increasing security threat. In Syria and Iraq, for example, the Islamic State group used UASs successfully against coalition forces. Documents recovered by Harvard University researcher Vera Mironova from a UAS workshop formerly under Islamic State control included detailed equipment lists, purchase receipts and a standardized UAS operational checklist. Additional findings indicate the Islamic State group's ability to procure and employ off-the-shelf UASs for both reconnaissance and intelligence-gathering, as well as the capacity to rig a UAS with improvised explosives that were dropped in-flight or detonated on the ground.

### The Challenge

A generation of U.S. Army officers was raised without any real thought of an air threat, and troops lack both the technology and training to combat this growing threat. When one of the authors of this article went through Ranger School more than 27 years ago, he knew how to react to air attack; the 1993 edition of the *Ranger Handbook* provided instructions that included figures (albeit fairly bad ones) for this battle drill.

Platoon leaders briefed "react to enemy air attack" as a coordinating instruction during every operations order. "For aircraft flying directly toward the unit, troops aim slightly above the nose," the handbook instructed. "To engage a jet plane flying a crossing course, all troops aim and fire their weapons two football-field lengths in front of the plane." For "helicopters and propeller-drive air-

craft," soldiers on the ground should aim "approximately one football-field" ahead. When one of the author's platoon experienced a hostile air attack during a rotation at the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana, in 1994, his soldiers knew where to aim.

Battle drills included in the most recent version of the *Ranger Handbook* include react to direct-fire contact, conduct a platoon assault, react to ambush (near), enter and clear a room, and react to indirect fire. Yet there is no battle drill for "react to UAS," despite their expanding threat. As a result, troops are left with little guidance of what to do and, unfortunately for many, the first time they may experience an enemy UAS is in combat.

Lacking appropriate technology and with limited counter-UAS training, one of the authors described a tactic used by soldiers in Iraq and Syria whereby a soldier was assigned as an air guard to scan the sky for UASs. But even if a UAS was spotted, the platoon lacked suitable countermeasures. It lacked doctrine, education, training and technology to combat the threat effectively.

### What to Do

Given the expanding use of UASs and across the spectrum of combat—from counterinsurgency to the gray zone to conventional combat—the Army needs to better prioritize this threat, and there are three areas in which it can take action to do so.

#### Doctrine and tactics, techniques

**and procedures:** According to Army doctrine, "A drill is a collective action (or task) ... performed by a platoon or smaller element without the application of a deliberate decision-making process. It is initiated on a cue, accomplished with minimal leader orders and performed to a standard throughout like units in the Army. The action is vital to success in combat operations, or critical to preserving life. It usually involves fire or maneuver." Until "react to enemy UAS" is incorporated into doctrine alongside other battle drills, success in combat and lives remain at a greater risk than they need be.

**Education and training:** The use of UASs for both reconnaissance and lethal purposes must be the way officers are taught to conceptualize enemy actions in professional military education courses. The Army must also expand UAS use in training. This is somewhat resource-intensive, especially given potential airspace issues, but if tough, realistic training is the goal, it is required at home station—especially as part of platoon training, since it should be a platoon battle drill. Encountering actual UASs (rather than "notional" ones) should be as ubiquitous as enemy indirect fire in training situations. If UASs are purely "notional" in training and employed only at the combat training centers, units will remain unprepared.

**Technology:** While counter-UAS technologies must continue to be developed and employed at the lowest level, it is important to not look for a "silver bullet" to counter UASs, just as there is no silver bullet to defeat an IED, a rifle round or artillery fire. Counter-UAS technology can help—including missiles, jamming, nets and other systems—but war is ultimately a human endeavor, so it is important to consider training, education, doctrine and technology together to combat this growing threat. ★

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**Maj. Gabriel Dearman** is a field artillery officer with multiple combat deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq. He has served in a variety of conventional and special operations units, most recently in the 75th Ranger Regiment. He is a General Wayne A. Downing Scholar pursuing a master's degree in security studies at Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.

# Back to the Future

## Leaders for Next Decade Can Learn From the '80s

By Lt. Col. Greg Lane

U.S. Army Reserve retired

**F**orty years ago this year, the Army was entering an incredible decade: the 1980s. The service underwent changes during those 10 years in which it saw no major combat, unlike in previous decades when wars made their marks.

The Army can learn from what happened then as we enter a new decade, the 2020s. Some lessons we can take away from the '80s include improving the Army education system, matching training and doctrine to combat the Army may face, advertising to attract soldiers to the force, growing special operations capabilities, and equipping the force to match/overmatch potential adversaries.

The Army retooled its education system in the 1980s. The initial NCO schools, the Primary NCO Course for combat arms soldiers and the Primary Leadership Course for other soldiers, were combined into the Primary Leadership Development Course in 1984, giving junior NCOs a common education experience. At the Advanced NCO Course, six common core objectives were incorporated into the program of instruction at all course locations, ensuring common core training for senior NCOs.

A nine-week staff course was developed for captains: the Combined Arms Services Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The first class began in April 1981. A brainchild of U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) commander Gen. Donn Starry, it trained officers in what staffs are, what staffs do and how staffs do what they do. In 1982, the School of Advanced Military Studies launched, also at Fort Leavenworth. This one-year course for handpicked majors graduating from



the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College featured planning and executing at the operational level of war.

For the Army of the 2020s, how well does its instruction for officers and NCOs work? What modifications are needed to be ready for upcoming challenges?

An Army training revolution occurred during the 1980s with the advent of the combat training centers. In TRADOC in the 1970s under Gen. William DePuy, the training mantra became “An Army must train as it fights.” The Army looked at its earlier experience at the World War II Desert Training Center site, used for individual and unit pre-deployment training.

That site, now Fort Irwin, California, became the National Training Center, used for professional devel-

**Clockwise from top left:** The AH-64 Apache attack helicopter, the M1 Abrams main battle tank, the UH-60 Black Hawk assault helicopter, the Patriot air defense missile system and the M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle were fielded to units across the Army in the early 1980s.

U.S. ARMY PHOTOS

opment of armor and mechanized infantry units. It saw its first rotation of units in October 1981. The Joint Readiness Training Center followed with training for light infantry, airborne, air assault and Ranger units at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas (now at Fort Polk, Louisiana), in October 1987. The Combined Maneuver Training Center, now the Joint Multinational Readiness Center, was set up at Hohenfels, Germany, for units in U.S. Army Europe.

For senior commanders and staffs, the Battle Command Training Program, established in January 1987, used computer-driven warfighter command post exercises based out of Fort Leavenworth. At the National Training Center, Joint Readiness Training Center and Combined Maneuver Training Center, tenant Army tactical units served as the opposing force to approximate a Soviet-style force, with the Soviet Union being the nation's most dangerous Cold War opponent. Observer-controller teams provided feedback to the rotational training units.

A measure of the toughness of defeating the opposing force is that only one rotational battalion, Task Force 4-68 from the 4th Infantry Division at Fort Carson, Colorado, in 1986, was able to emerge successful in all nine force-on-force and live missions since the National Training Center's inception in 1981.

What modifications need to be made in Army training to face the nation's potential adversaries in the next 10 years? Is there discernable doctrine, as well as tactics, techniques and procedures, of our most dangerous potential foes the Army can train for to prepare for that fight? Is there a post or posts that could serve as a training site for these scenarios, or are current posts and training areas sufficient?

### Doctrinal Debate

A doctrinal shift occurred in the 1980s. Earlier, the 1976 edition of Field Manual (FM) 100-5: Operations provided great internal debate in the Army over the manual's concept of active defense. Provoking thought and discussion on how the Army would fight its next war, the manual drew

criticism for focusing too heavily on the "first battle" and defensive warfare.

The subsequent FM 100-5, published in 1982, pushed the concept of AirLand Battle, developed by Starry, then the new TRADOC commander. Starry, seeing the massive Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces, realized that defeating the first echelon of an enemy attack would not provide ultimate victory on the European battlefield. AirLand Battle focused on winning campaigns and the "deep fight" of defeating echelons of attacking enemy forces behind their lead forces. This became the Army's concept for warfighting until the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s.

Equipment changed as well. Described as the "Big Five" of equipment fielding in the early 1980s, these systems entered Army units: the UH-60 Black Hawk assault helicopter, the AH-64 Apache attack helicopter, the M1 Abrams main battle tank, the M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle and the Patriot air defense missile system. These were fielded to units across the Army, with the bow wave of new equipment arrivals beginning in 1983.

Other new equipment also was issued in the 1980s: the Multiple Launch Rocket System, the Humvee and the Squad Automatic Weapon. The Army's commitment to modernizing its equipment was clear.

### The Right Mix

Force structure came under scrutiny in terms of facing Soviet forces in Europe as well as other potential threats. Gen. Edward "Shy" Meyer, Army chief of staff from June 1979 to June 1983, oversaw the origins of what became the "Army of Excellence." The heavy divisions (armored and mechanized infantry) gained combat strength. The tank and mechanized infantry battalions each added a fourth infantry or tank company, and a fourth maneuver brigade-sized unit was added to each division, evolving into what is now the combat aviation brigade.

## What modifications need to be made in Army training to face the nation's potential adversaries in the next 10 years?

Meyer also looked to make the standard infantry division a lighter force. He made the 9th Infantry Division at Fort Lewis, Washington, a test bed for high mobility/high-tech equipment and concepts. Gen. John Wickham, his successor, would approve the light division concept with a 10,000-man cap, so the entire division could deploy in 500 C-141B Starlifter air sorties. The 7th Infantry Division at Fort Ord, California, became the first light division, followed by the 25th Infantry Division in Hawaii. Two more divisions were activated in the 1980s as light divisions, the 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) at Fort Drum, New York, and the 6th Infantry Division in Alaska.

Though Army senior leaders pushed for raising the Army's end strength by 5,000–15,000 in the early 1980s, DoD and congressional opposition prevented that. Meyer accepted the cap of the Army's end strength, then concentrated on equipment modernization.

When the two additional light divisions were added, some voiced concern that the Army was "hollowing out" with not enough soldiers to man these units. Questions arose about the survivability of light divisions on a mid- to high-intensity battlefield.

The question of a hollowed-out Army sounds familiar to today's force, with questions about the adequacy of the Army's end strength and the loss of multiple brigade-sized units arising during the sequestration drawdown of the mid-2010s. How will the Army's end strength and force structure turn out in this decade?

### Marketing Reach

Army advertising took a new direction in 1980. Under Maj. Gen. (later Gen.) Maxwell Thurman, commander of the U.S. Army Recruiting Command, the Army sought effective ways to attract soldiers. Dissatisfied with previous slogans like "Join the People Who Joined the Army," Thurman worked with the ad agency N.W. Ayer,



putting real soldiers in commercials with a message of adventure, upward mobility and getting an education. The result was one of the 1980s' most recognizable advertisements, "Be All You Can Be." That ad campaign shifted thinking about military service from being an obligation to being an opportunity. The Army saw measurable improvement: 91% of recruits in 1987 had a high school diploma, compared to 57% in 1980.

The question for today, just as in 1980, is, what connects with young adults to motivate them to check out the Army? In 2019, a new advertising campaign to reach Generation Z (those born in the 1990s through 2010) debuted, with the theme "Warriors Wanted." It seeks to appeal to those interested in esports or "functional fitness."

The Army's special operations community expanded during the 1980s. In 1984, the 3rd Ranger Battalion and the Ranger Regiment headquarters were activated at Fort Benning, Georgia. That same year, a fourth Special Forces group, the 1st Special Forces

Group, was activated at Fort Lewis. The 160th Special Operations Aviation Battalion was formed at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, in 1981. It became the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne) in 1990. Its formation was driven by the aviation mishaps of the 1980 Operation Eagle Claw, which was a failed military mission to rescue American hostages in Iran. The U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command was established in 1985 at Fort Bragg.

### Different Kind of War

There was a growing recognition of the importance of low-intensity conflict, especially in light of Soviet-sponsored subversions in Latin America, Africa and Asia. Also feeding the interest in low-intensity conflict was the infusion of cocaine and other illegal drugs into the U.S. from Latin America.

The Army of Excellence was tested with Operation Just Cause in Panama in December 1989. The improved quality of Army soldiers, better training in the NCO education sys-

tem, more Ranger-qualified soldiers and better unit training at the combat training centers received credit for U.S. success in this operation. The Army, in conjunction with the other services, hit dozens of targets the night of Dec. 19–20, 1989, quickly overwhelming the Panamanian Defense Force.

This victory was a great legacy of the Army of Excellence. This example is worthy of study and emulation today for the Army of the next decade. ★

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Operation Just Cause in Panama in December 1989 was a key test of the Army of Excellence, a sweeping effort to improve how the service trained and equipped the force.

U.S. ARMY

U.S. Army Photos by **Sgt. Alexander Skripnichuk**



# Healing and Remembrance On Gold Star Peak

**P**aratroopers with the 4th Brigade Combat Team (Airborne), 25th Infantry Division, paid tribute to their fallen brothers and sisters in arms by hiking up Gold Star Peak in Alaska. The 4,148-foot peak in the Chugach Mountains was named in 2018 in honor of fallen service members and their families. The effort was spearheaded by retired 1st Sgt. Kirk Alkire, a veteran of the brigade who wanted to honor the Gold Star families of the 53 paratroopers killed during the unit's 15-month deployment to Iraq in 2006 and 2007.





# Catching Excellence

## Brigade Works to Train Soldiers for Expert Infantryman Badge Test

By Command Sgt. Maj.  
Vincent Simonetti

**T**he great football coach Vince Lombardi said it best: “Perfection is not attainable, but if we chase perfection, we can catch excellence.” The U.S. Army catches excellence in its building and maintenance of readiness, execution of combat operations, and support missions other than war important to national leaders. At the brigade level, a high operational tempo requires a pursuit of excellence at every opportunity from the team leader to brigade commander and command sergeant major.

In its simplest form, excellence is a state that is a cut above the average or mediocre. It can, however, be wrongly associated with a mastery of the fundamentals and constantly starting over from the beginning. Excellence is about doing things well routinely and establishing a baseline to maintain and grow. Too often, units miss opportunities by looking at training as distinct events with singular purposes. Expert Infantryman Badge training and testing is such an example.

Within the 2nd Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, at Fort Carson, Colorado, a chance to commit to a training opportunity of individual soldiers and setting an example of training management supports the leadership philosophies of the brigade commander and commanders of higher headquarters. It is an opportunity to build a cohesive and disciplined unit as well. A cohesive and disciplined unit achieves excellence on and off the battlefield and

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A soldier with the 2nd Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, is pinned with the Expert Infantryman Badge by his wife after completing testing at Fort Carson, Colorado.

U.S. ARMY/STAFF SGT. NEYSA CANFIELD



commits itself to a command climate of mutual trust that wins.

### Tool for Success

Cohesive and disciplined units use tools to plan, resource and execute training. Army Doctrine Publication 7-0: Training outlines the principles of unit training, providing a guideline and tool to aid success. The principles are: commanders and other leaders are responsible for training; NCOs train individuals, crews and small teams; train to standard; train as you will fight; train while operating; train fundamentals first; train to develop adaptability; understand the operational environment; train to sustain; and train to maintain.

Within the 2nd Infantry Brigade Combat Team, the brigade and battalion staffs applied the principles and leveraged the planning prior to execution of Expert Infantryman Badge training and testing to develop NCOs on the Army's eight-step training model. The eight-step training model is a tool to aid in the training of leaders and units.

Sustainers, such as mechanics, cooks and ammunition specialists, utilized the preparation phase to certify leaders on ammunition supply point procedures and reinforce good habits, such as NCOs conducting pre-combat checks and inspections, and soldiers using as-issued equipment to build confidence.

During the execution phase of training, soldiers conducted physical readiness training at every station during the train-up to prepare for the EIB Physical Fitness Assessment; sustainers conducted twice-daily distribution platoon patrols to and from the land navigation site with a provided task and purpose and followed troop-leading procedures; and leaders who were identified as doing well were used to train less-experienced soldiers.

### Grabbing the Opportunity

The brigade used the buildup to Expert Infantryman Badge testing as an opportunity taken to pursue excellence. The training schedule presents an opportunity for leaders to catch

excellence, but requires thought to not miss the opportunity.

Training schedules fill quickly, and sometimes a desire to maximize training leads to filling all time with singular events and not providing adequate time for necessary training events and missions. A way to maximize training is to combine events with increasing levels of intensity. Expert Infantryman Badge training and testing lasts several weeks and typically is one station and one event at a time. One station and one event at a time may offer focus, but there are opportunities to take advantage and direct focus.

As a soldier transitions from station to station throughout a day, and lane to lane throughout the week, it is imperative to provide enough training aids and references to ensure focused training, multiple repetitions and reinforcement of good habits. As training and testing progress, soldiers are removed due to reasons ranging from administrative actions, not meeting prerequisites and not being competitive for the badge.

### Excellence in Training

Within the 2nd Infantry Brigade Combat Team, soldiers continued to train during test week by executing separate, identical lanes and completing a 12-mile foot march. Participants knew the standard was excellence in training to prepare for upcoming collective events, and infantrymen completed three weeks of training to the highest standards regardless of earning the badge.

Brigade combat teams pursue excellence daily and balance a high operational tempo and training priorities. Every year, brigade combat teams allocate land, ammunition, training aids and time—the most important resource—to conduct Expert Infantryman Badge testing. This considerable investment yields, on average, 96 awarded Expert Infantryman Badges, or 12% of a brigade's eligible candidates. The remaining 88% are soldiers who require retraining within a tightly scheduled and already committed training schedule that may or may not be addressed. At future training events, leaders ob-



serve training scars that range from soldiers' inability to communicate a spot report, label a grid coordinate on a map or know how to evacuate a casualty.

During collective training and culminating training events at combat training centers, too often, units and observer coach/trainers spend considerable time addressing individual training skills that atrophied over previous months. Wasted time and missed opportunities contribute to atrophy. Expert Infantryman Badge training and testing is a way a brigade sets the right example, but it is the daily leadership of NCOs that reinforces the training philosophy.

### High Standard

NCO leadership, like that shown during Expert Infantryman Badge training, is imperative to maintain a high standard during training events, to not let opportunity pass by and to invest in twofers and "threefers." Twofers and threefers are training events that yield increased results in exposing soldiers to more repetitions, giving them more experience and helping them build more confidence. An example is a rifle qualification range that includes the receipt of an order, publishing a squad-level order, a foot march to the range and back, a medical evacuation lane on-site, rifle qualification and after-action review.



The result is fitter soldiers who beat training atrophy and have a structurally sound base to continue to build upon. They can catch excellence. ★

**Command Sgt. Maj. Vincent Simonetti** is the command sergeant major of the 1st Battalion, 196th Infantry Brigade, Hawaii, the only training support battalion within U.S. Army Pacific. Previously, he served as interim command sergeant major of the 2nd Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division. He has served with light, airborne, air assault and Stryker infantry units and worked as a recruiter, drill sergeant and observer coach/trainer. He was deployed during Operations Iraqi Freedom, Enduring Freedom and Freedom's Sentinel.

**Top:** A soldier pulls a simulated casualty during Expert Infantryman Badge training at Fort Carson, Colorado. **Above:** Col. Dave Zinn, right, 2nd Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division commander, awards 1st Lt. Ted Gallagher the Expert Infantryman Badge.

U.S. ARMY PHOTOS BY STAFF SGT. NEYSA CANFIELD

# Pandemic Fever

## Current, Former Medical Personnel Take on COVID-19

By Maj. Gen. George Alexander, M.D., Army National Guard retired

**T**he 1918 influenza pandemic was one of the world's most severe diseases in modern history. About 500 million people became infected with the virus, and some 20 million to 50 million people died worldwide.

In the U.S., the infection was first identified in soldiers at Camp Funston, now Fort Riley, Kansas, in the spring of 1918. There were about 675,000 deaths in the U.S. in 1918 from the flu, with high mortality among previously healthy people, including those ages 20-40. There was no vaccine to provide protection.

In December 2019, the world saw the beginning of another pandemic, this one shortly identified as being from severe acute respiratory coronavirus 2. COVID-19, the illness caused by this virus, overwhelmed health care systems globally. In Wuhan, China, where the disease was first reported, COVID-19 was found in a seafood and poultry market. This virus spread rapidly to almost every continent, infecting millions and becoming fatal to several hundred thousand people.

Around the world, incidence and mortality rates from COVID-19 increased on a daily basis. In the U.S., the disease was first observed in Washington state near Seattle. It mushroomed nationwide and spread to many of our country's largest cities. The Institute of Health Metrics and Evaluation, an independent global health research center at the University of Washington, projected

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Sgt. Aaron Jaapar, of the Nebraska Army National Guard's 267th Maintenance Company, carries canned corn to be distributed to those in need by the Food Bank of Lincoln.

NEBRASKA NATIONAL GUARD/SGT. LISA CRAWFORD



nearly 135,000 U.S. deaths due to COVID-19 by August.

One important threat our nation faces is rapid spreading of COVID-19 and increasing deaths as more people succumb to the infection. Diagnosing patients with COVID-19 is important. A missed diagnosis in an individual can put family, friends, indeed, entire communities at risk of developing the disease.

### Military's Role

An important question is what role the U.S. military will play in the COVID-19 response. The National Guard was deployed initially because it comes under the command of state governors. In peacetime, governors have discretion about the use of their state's National Guard. Governors from all 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam and the

U.S. Virgin Islands have activated components of their Army and Air National Guard. As of this writing, about 45,000 Army and Air National Guard personnel were deployed in support of these responses to the pandemic.

Two types of military support would be most useful in the COVID-19 pandemic: medical units and base facilities for quarantine. Using military medical personnel will prove vital if the number of infections surpasses what the civilian health care system can manage. The military has a large medical establishment. The Military Health System (MHS) is one of America's largest and most elaborate health care establishments, and the world's foremost military health care delivery system. It provides care to active-duty service members, members of the reserve component, retired military

personnel and their dependents. With an annual budget of \$50 billion, it employs some 137,000 people.

The MHS saves lives on the battlefield, fights infectious diseases around the world and treats some 9.5 million beneficiaries. If the COVID-19 pandemic gets much worse, military medical personnel probably will be occupied taking care of patients at military hospitals. Since most of the wartime medical capability is in the reserve component, particularly in the U.S. Army Reserve, these medical units could be mobilized and sent to select hard-hit COVID-19 areas.

### Medical Support

The Navy has two hospital ships, the *Comfort*, homeported in Norfolk, Virginia, and the *Mercy*, homeported in San Diego. These ships have large capacities, with 1,000 beds and 12 operating rooms each. They were deployed to New York City and the Port of Los Angeles, respectively, though the *Comfort* left New York at the end of April after treating 182 patients, about 70% of whom had COVID-19. The infected patients were admitted after the ship's mission changed. The *Mercy*, which did not take any COVID-19 patients, released its last patient on May 5.

These hospital ships make excellent quarantine facilities by separating the sick from the general population. The Navy also has amphibious ships with large berthing areas and medical facilities that could be pressed into service as quarantine wards.

In New York City, the 531st Army Field Hospital from Fort Campbell, Kentucky, and the 9th Hospital Center from Fort Hood, Texas, cared for 255 patients at the Jacob K. Javits Convention Center field medical site, and 366 military medical personnel, comprising 163 doctors, 190 nurses and 13 respiratory therapists, were dispersed to city hospitals. In Seattle, the field hospital set up by the 627th Hospital Center from Fort Carson, Colorado, and the 47th Combat Support Hospital from Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington, was disassembled in mid-April after not being needed and

was to be relocated, according to DoD officials.

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is constructing 21 alternative care facilities to be used in the event that hospitals become overwhelmed with COVID-19 patients. These facilities are expected to add thousands of beds in states and cities with bed shortages. The Army is seeking retired medical soldiers to support COVID-19 efforts, with more than 27,000 retirees showing interest in returning to active duty.

Military bases were used to quarantine citizens who may have returned home to the U.S. from COVID-19-infected areas overseas or a boat cruise. Military bases are well-suited for such missions because access is easily controlled. Bases have capabilities already in operation, including medical, food and housing. These facilities easily allow for citizen transition into a quarantined status.

### Lessons Learned

The COVID-19 pandemic has challenged the U.S. military in many ways. Prior experience from the 1918 influenza pandemic provides little guidance on how to approach COVID-19. Each day, more is learned. There are instructive lessons from this dangerous threat confronting the United States.

The mobilization of the MHS in cooperation with the public health and health care delivery systems in major cities is needed to supplement medical care provided for large numbers of sick patients in emergency departments and intensive care units.

Employing force-health protection at Walter Reed National Military Medical Center, Maryland, by restricting access control points and monitoring and screening patients for COVID-19 has worked well. With the influx of patients to Walter Reed's emergency department because of concerns about COVID-19, it has become imperative to keep the emergency department and hospital free of potentially infectious patients. To remedy this situation, the infectious-disease team set up a COVID-19

screening station to make sure these patients do not come into the emergency department to get screened and/or tested for COVID-19. This is a positive lesson learned.

Walter Reed continues to provide acute, urgent and emergent care services for active-duty personnel and beneficiaries. This treatment option can get active-duty service members back to their units quickly.

It is of interest to note that telehealth and virtual health options are being provided to military beneficiaries to take care of their health care needs, such as refilling prescriptions or for follow-up appointments. This allows recipients to take advantage of telehealth best practices.

Collaboration between the U.S. military and states is vital to ensure COVID-19 policies adequately consider military and civilian health care workers' unique positions in a crisis. Morale is fundamentally important in their situations. In times of crisis, the strongest possible motivation for military medical workers to toil under difficult conditions is knowing they are saving lives. This is a valuable lesson learned.

A sobering lesson has come from the treatment outcome of COVID-19 patients. We are still learning how to combat this disease. Orchestrating this mission requires sound science, broad collaboration and transfer of ongoing research into benefits for patients.

We must fight this infectious disease with all available resources. ★

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**Maj. Gen. George Alexander, M.D.**, Army National Guard retired, is a former commander of a medical detachment; the 116th Mobile Army Surgical Hospital; and the 136th Combat Support Hospital. He later served as assistant surgeon general and deputy surgeon general for the Army National Guard in the Office of the U.S. Army Surgeon General. He earned his medical degree from Howard University College of Medicine, Washington, D.C., and completed postgraduate medical specialty training at the University of Texas MD Anderson Cancer Center, Houston.



**Clockwise from top:** A 2nd Armored Division tank destroyer digs in for long-range shelling across the Roer River in Belgium on the first day of the Battle of the Bulge. Soldiers take position on a hill covering an approach in Bastogne, Belgium. Regrouped 28th Infantry Division soldiers walk down a street in Bastogne after the initial German onslaught. Olin Dows' painting depicts soldiers moving through Bastogne as civilians flee.

U.S. ARMY IMAGES



# Surprise in The Ardennes

Command, Intelligence Failures Led to Battle of the Bulge

By Col. Gregory Fontenot  
U.S. Army retired

**O**n Dec. 16, 1944, nearly a quarter-million German soldiers in some 28 divisions attacked along the 80 miles of “quiet sector” in their country stretching from Monschau in the north to just west of the city of Trier in the south. Nine panzer divisions formed the main striking arm, fielding more than 1,000 tanks and assault guns. Supporting artillery numbered almost 2,000 howitzers, guns and rocket launchers.

By sunset, exultant Germans had forged the Our River and were headed toward Bastogne, Belgium. In the

south, the U.S. 4th Infantry Division held on. In the north, the 18th Volksgrenadier Division had isolated two American regiments on the Schnee Eifel. Surprise was complete. In the weeks that followed, the U.S. Army bent rather than broke in the largest battle it fought during World War II.

While the Battle of the Bulge was huge in terms of number of American soldiers and units involved, its cost also was enormous. The U.S. Army suffered some 80,000 casualties, including 8,607 killed in action, 47,139 wounded and 21,144 captured or missing, former Army historian and Battle of the Bulge veteran Charles

MacDonald reported in *A Time for Trumpets: The Untold Story of the Battle of the Bulge*. German reckoning is less certain, but according to *World War II in Europe: A Concise History* by Marvin Perry, the Germans suffered 12,652 killed, 38,600 wounded and about 30,000 captured or missing. Trench foot, sickness and nonbattle injuries claimed thousands more on both sides.

## Blame Game

Why did the Germans achieve this nearly catastrophic surprise? The answer has implications for contemporary soldiers. In December 1944, the U.S. Army exploited signals intelligence, imagery intelligence, human intelligence, indeed, all the “ints” available today, less satellite and cyber intelligence. The Allies also had Ultra, giving them access to German coded military communications.

Arguing over who was to blame began immediately and continued throughout the rest of the war, and, for that matter, ever since. The protagonists included senior commanders and their intelligence officers at Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, 12th Army Group and First U.S. Army, commanded, respectively, by Gen. Dwight Eisenhower and Lt. Gens. Omar Bradley and Courtney Hodges.

Estimates of enemy intentions and what to do as a result were then, and are now, the province of commanders supported by intelligence officers. Intelligence officers plan the collection and analysis of combat information. Analysis produces intelligence. Commanders play an iterative role in the process. Their judgment about enemy capability and intentions is decisive.

Ironically, Allied commanders and their intelligence officers, including those in First Army and its subordinate corps, knew the general location and capability of the German units that “surprised” them. At First Army, Col. Benjamin “Monk” Dickson’s estimates showed he knew most of the locations of the Fifth and Sixth Panzer Armies. Along with 7th Army, they comprised the counteroffensive force under Army Group B.



On Nov. 20, Dickson's Estimate No. 36 reported the movement of Sixth Panzer Army units from "BIELEFELD-PADERBORN-GLADBACH across the Rhine into the battle area." Dickson accurately identified the Sixth Panzer Army's divisions though he believed, incorrectly, that the Panzer Lehr Division was subordinated to the Sixth Panzer Army rather than the Fifth Panzer Army.

Given the German concentration north and west of Cologne, Dickson originally believed the Germans positioned their reserve to mount a short, sharp attack to break up Allied offensive maneuvers. However, in Estimate No. 36 he concluded that the "enemy's capability of a spoiling attack is now lost."

#### **Overconfident Army**

The Germans attempted to portray their concentration forward as defensive. From the point of view



of Allied intelligence officers and commanders, the German deception effort and Dickson's assessment made perfect sense. From the breakout at St. Lo, France, in late July until the end of September, the Allies in the west had run roughshod over the Germans. The Allied exploitation and pursuit culminated along the Siegfried Line. At the end

of September, Eisenhower admitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, "The enemy has now succeeded in establishing a relatively stable and cohesive front." In October, he concluded, "We have chased the Hun out of France, but he is fighting bitterly on his own frontiers." Nevertheless, no senior commander or his intelligence officer believed a major Ger-



man counterattack likely, let alone a counteroffensive.

Nearly a year earlier, on Nov. 3, 1943, Adolf Hitler had issued Führer Order 51. That order shifted the main effort from the Russian front to the west. Hitler hoped to fight a decisive battle that would cause the American alliance with England to collapse. Hitler believed a negotiated settlement would follow and he could shift his main effort back to the east. Hugh Cole, author of the Army's official history, *The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge*, argued that "By 19 August [1944] Hitler had made up his mind: an attack would be made ... on the Western Front, and the target date would be November." Ultimately, Hitler decided to attack in the Ardennes.

### Tables Are Turned

Hubris combined with implacable complacency was central to the December surprise. In August, when Hitler decided on his counteroffensive, the U.S. Army was beating the Germans. Logic, from the American point of view, required the Germans to assume a defensive posture.

Despite growing evidence coming from the front that something was afoot, senior commanders sought successfully to confirm their bias. As a consequence, the Americans failed to understand the purpose of the German concentration they watched unfold. Worse, Eisenhower and his subordinates failed to develop contingency plans in the event they were mistaken.

Developing intelligence is a dynamic process that includes exploiting the means of collection and revisiting areas of interest to maintain a continuous estimate of the situation. So, what happened in the fall of 1944? Some argue that the staff of First U.S. Army headquarters, including the commanding general, was tired. Of course they were tired; they had been fighting continuously since June. It is, however, hard to see how the staff at First Army should be any more fatigued than their German antagonists.

At Hodges' First Army, the "G-2 [intelligence] reports keep putting emphasis on the fact that 6 Panzer Armee is drawing up on the other

side of the ROER with at least three of its six armored divisions facing the First Army front. Reports from prisoners indicate that moral[e] is high." Yet Hodges did "not appear unduly concerned," according to a First Army diary kept by Hodges' aides. He seemed uninterested in what the Germans might do as he focused on what he planned to do. On Dec. 13, Hodges' V Corps launched an attack toward the Roer River just north of where the Germans attacked three days later.

On Dec. 10, Dickson issued Estimate 37 concluding that a counteroffensive was possible but would come after "our major ground forces have crossed the Roer River." Dickson did not consider this option the most likely enemy course of action. There

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**Clockwise from opposite top:** American troops wearing bedsheets for camouflage cross a snowy field in Luxembourg during a scouting mission. U.S. soldiers man a roadblock with a .30-caliber machine gun. A white-painted M36 tank destroyer traverses a field in Luxembourg.

U.S. ARMY PHOTOS



is no evidence that Hodges gave much thought to this possibility. His diary reports only that he had a “short consultation with Colonel Dickson.” Hodges remained focused on his plans and not the enemy.

### Assuming Risk

In fall 1944, the shortage of infantry replacements was so serious that Eisenhower had to assume risk in order to generate forces to return to the offensive. He and Bradley accepted risk in the Ardennes Forest. The Ardennes, together with its German extensions, the Schnee Eifel and the Hurtgen Forest, divided the front. There were four Allied field armies north of the forest and three more south of it. In October, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force had 54 divisions on the Continent with six more staging in the U.K. With the line of contact extending more than 500 miles, Eisenhower

had too few divisions. The supreme commander had to economize.

He and Bradley chose to economize in the Ardennes, which extended from Monshau, Belgium, all the way to Luxemburg in the south. Maj. Gen. Troy Middleton’s VIII Corps had three divisions defending some 80 miles of front in the Ardennes and a thin sliver of forest in Germany. Roughly a third of the newly arrived 9th Armored Division formed the VIII Corps reserve with another third in the line. The remainder was attached to V Corps. The Ardennes was chosen because it was more obstacle than avenue of approach.

VIII Corps took over the Ardennes sector in October. Soon after, Middleton complained to Bradley about the position. Bradley was sanguine, remarking, “Don’t worry Troy. They [the Germans] won’t come through here.” Middleton responded, “Maybe not Brad, but they’ve come through here before.” And so they had, in 1870, 1914 and 1940.

Middleton had a similar conversation with Maj. Gen. Walter Robertson, who commanded the 2nd Infantry Division. When Robertson complained about the sector, Middle-

ton advised him to “go back to sleep Robby. You’ve been having a bad dream.” In the week before the attack, Maj. Gen. Alan Jones’ 106th Infantry Division replaced Robertson’s outfit. Jones complained to Robertson that he had too much to defend. Robertson answered by saying, “Take it easy, general. The Krauts won’t attack even if ordered to.”

### Overly Optimistic

Time passed quietly in the Ardennes that fall. On Dec. 9, Col. Andrew Reeves, VIII Corps intelligence officer, asserted that the enemy’s posture “indicates his desire to have this sector remain quiet and inactive.” Complacency spread downward as well. Robertson, despite his earlier concern, did not seek to confirm or deny the danger he originally perceived. The VIII Corps sector in the Ardennes had become “the nursery and the old folks’ home of the American command,” as Army historian MacDonald wrote in *The Siegfried Line Campaign*.

Perceptions of German capability and intentions had been relentlessly optimistic since August, when Bradley’s 12th Army Group

**Above:** A 7th Armored Division anti-tank gun covers a road near Vielsalm, Belgium.

**Opposite:** Soldiers with the 101st Airborne Division observe a resupply airdrop in Bastogne, Belgium.

U.S. ARMY PHOTOS



asserted, “The August battles have done it and the enemy in the West has had it.” On Dec. 12, Brig. Gen. Edwin Sibert, Bradley’s intelligence officer, concluded, “It is now certain that attrition is steadily sapping the strength of German forces on the western front.” He went on to add that the “the crust is thinner, more brittle and more vulnerable.” The intelligence was wrong dramatically, and the argument over blame ensued. The official history described the debate as “public polemic, personal vituperation, and ex parte vindication” in order to “fix blame and secure absolution.”

Therein lies the heart of the problem. Neither intelligence officers nor commanders collaborated effectively. They competed for resources, dissembled and resorted to backbiting. For those who doubt this assertion, read British Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery and Bradley’s memoirs, Gen. George Patton Jr.’s diary, or any of the official histories. The fact

is the U.S. and Allied high commands remained focused inward on their plans rather than what their adversary might do.

### **Commanders Responsible**

Who, then, is responsible? The answer is obvious—commanders. Eisenhower, Bradley and Middleton deserve the lion’s share of the blame. The one thing all these officers shared is their responsibility as commanders to decide what must be done. Tender egos, hubris and complacency led to mistaken conclusions.

None of the commanders and their staffs got it right. Their failure to mitigate known risks is far worse. Bradley failed to take Middleton’s concerns seriously. Middleton rejected Robertson’s concerns. Hodges, whose intelligence staff concluded a counteroffensive was possible, did nothing. Robertson’s 2nd Infantry Division failed to patrol actively or even update its estimates.

Today, some believe the U.S. Army

will have far better visibility on enemy activity based on improved sensors enabled by artificial intelligence. This allegedly will enable units to fathom an adversary’s capability and, more importantly, his intentions.

This view fails to account for the single most important product of effective intelligence—we must perceive our adversary’s options as they do. Estimating enemy intentions is the commanders’ function. Confirmation bias shown by U.S. commanders and their intelligence officers some 75 years ago remains a danger today and likely will remain so in the future. ★

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**Col. Gregory Fontenot**, U.S. Army retired, commanded a tank battalion in Operation Desert Storm and an armor brigade in Bosnia. A former director of the School of Advanced Military Studies, his most recent book is *Loss and Redemption at St. Vith: The 7th Armored Division in the Battle of the Bulge*.

# World War I's Often-Overlooked Tankers

## 301st Battalion Tamed Massive Machines

By Lt. Col. Robert Bateman  
U.S. Army retired

In 1918, as the U.S. fought its major battles of World War I, two American tank battalions entered the fray under the command of then-Lt. Col. George Patton Jr. Fighting from light French-made Renaults, these soldiers comprised the first U.S. tank units to fight in the war.


Each American tank had a driver and a commander/gunner, and that was it. The Renaults carried only a machine gun or a 37 mm hand-loaded cannon. Patton himself commanded on foot—and was shot for his efforts. The stories that came out of the combat experiences of these two battalions are almost legendary, and they are well entrenched in the collective memory of professionals and buffs alike as the summary of America's armored experience in World War I. But that narrative omits a large chunk of history. There was another American tank battalion that saw combat.

Almost a third of the American



**Clockwise from above:** President Woodrow Wilson gets a close look at a tank during a drive to sell Liberty Loan war bonds near the White House in 1918. Soldiers and horse-drawn caissons wait alongside a narrow road while Renault tanks pass in 1918. Recruiting and inspirational posters and an official song promote the new U.S. Tank Corps. Lt. Col. George Patton Jr. stands next to a Renault tank in France in 1918.

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS IMAGES EXCEPT RIGHT: U.S. ARMY





men in the World War I tank corps who saw combat were trained by the British in their heavy tanks—massive rhomboidal monsters with multiple cannons and machine guns manned by crews four times the size of those little French-made tankettes. The story of these American fighting men was lost over time.


This is the story of the men who fought in the “lost battalion” of American World War I tankers, who were lost not on the battlefields of France but to the annals of history. This is the story of the 301st Battalion, U.S. Tank Corps.

### Barely a Dent

In April 1917, the U.S. Army entered World War I amid a confluence of congressional limitations, stagnated ideas, institutional inertia and branch parochialism. Sadly, that combination was not new. The best it had was a concept, a briefing-point idea that somehow every American was a natural-born rifleman. Such men, the thinking went, could break open German trenches and restore the fight to one of open warfare. This thinking prevailed despite almost three years of watching the world’s two largest empires—the British and the French—fail to make more than a dent in the war with their own infantry and artillery at the cost of millions of casualties.

It was not until well after the U.S. joined the war that the U.S. Army devoted much attention to the use of armor, conducting two studies examining the French and British approaches to armored warfare. The French went with light tanks; the British with heavies. Soon, a decision was made: The U.S. would split the difference, committing to a combination of heavy tanks and doctrine based on the British “Mark” designs, and light tanks using French doctrine and Renault tanks. Not knowing where else to put them within the existing force structure, the Army slapped them into engineer units.

So it was that the first American tank forces were created out of an engineer unit, the 65th Engineer Brigade. This occurred not in the first few weeks or months of the war, but a full 10 months later, in February 1918. Admittedly, other American tank units were formed in Europe some 60 days earlier, but that effort was mostly on paper. In the Zone of the Interior (as the U.S. was termed at the time), one part of the 65th Engineers was redesignated as the 1st Separate Battalion, Heavy Tank Service, 65th Engineers, while two other units were made battalions of the Light Tank Service. Most of these forces were initially concentrated at Camp Upton in New York, though one part of the for-





mation, a single company of the heavy battalion, formed at Camp (now Fort) Meade, Maryland.

Most of the heavy tank service would soon be relocated to Camp Meade, where they were met by an enthusiastic young major named Dwight Eisenhower. Already an accomplished trainer and organizer, Eisenhower dove into the task of converting the newly trained soldiers into even more newly minted tankers, despite not having a single tank to even examine, let alone train on. He did so with the

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**Left to right:** A U.S. Army Renault tank traverses a trench in France in 1918. A National Museum of the United States Army display depicts a World War I soldier standing in front of a Renault. U.S. soldiers in the hatches of their Renault in France in 1918.

LEFT TO RIGHT: LIBRARY OF CONGRESS. NATIONAL MUSEUM OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS

understanding that he would command the battalion when it shipped overseas to train with the British. But it was not to be. Little more than a month later, in April 1918, the battalion received its deployment orders, sans Eisenhower.

### On to England

The 1st Separate Battalion was soon renumbered as the tank corps became a separate branch of the Army. It was as the 301st Tank Battalion that the soldiers began training in England with the British on their Mark V and Mark V Star heavy tanks. The U.S. Army still owned not a single combat tank, but the British army training depot had the resources to prepare the Americans as a unit capable of falling in on a battalion's worth of tanks (48 tanks was the standard at the time) once in the combat zone.

But this training would come with a

price. Faced with manpower and materiel shortages, especially in the wake of the spring 1918 German offensives, the British were loath to cede both the materiel and the combat potential of the newly prepared Americans.

In exchange for being equipped, the British asked the Americans to fight alongside their forces under British command in their zone of the Western Front. Gen. John Pershing, commander of the American Expeditionary Forces, decided this was not an issue to fall upon his sword.

In August 1918, the 301st Tank Battalion deployed to France, where it fell in on British tanks and organized for its baptism of fire on a notorious battlefield, the Somme.

Historians differ in their divisions of time and events. By some accounts, there was only one Battle of the Somme. It began in July 1916 and lasted through November. Others divide the struggle



into subfights over the following years. The men of the 301st did not wonder about this, so far as the records show, at the time. What they knew was that on the night of Sept. 27, they made their approach march of some 6 miles, laid up until the next evening, then trundled the last few miles to the departure line. H-Hour was to be 5:50 a.m. on Sept. 29, 1918.

### Time to Fight

For this fight, the 301st supported the National Guard's 27th Infantry Division. To provide broader support to the infantry, this single battalion was divided across the division front. Company A, with 15 tanks, went in with the 108th Infantry Regiment, Company B's 10 tanks went with the 105th Infantry, while Company C and its 15 tanks assisted the 107th Infantry. If those numbers seem low, remember that unlike the 6-ton, two-man tanks fighting under Patton, these behemoths each weighed 29–32 tons and were 26–32 feet long, depending on the model. In the so-called male version of these tanks, the crews manned a minimum of four machine guns and carried two British 6-pounder (57 mm) cannons. The female tanks carried six machine guns. At least eight men were needed to operate each tank, but often there were as many as 15 soldiers inside. That first morning, six of the planned 40 tanks did not make it to the start line, so only 34 went over the top at H-Hour. The first fight did not go well.

Miscommunication, chaos, mechanical failures and the fog of war descended upon the 301st with a vengeance. The numbers ultimately tell the tale.

Of the 34 tanks that trundled for-



ward, 16 were destroyed by direct fire or artillery, two ran into an unmarked British minefield laid the previous year, and nine fell into trenches or were ditched by other battlefield hazards. Just five reached their objective, the vaunted Hindenburg Line. Three officers and 17 enlisted men died on the battlefield, another 85 were wounded, and seven more went missing for a total of 112 men—or roughly 33% of those who entered the fight.

That was their first day. They kept fighting.

### Carried Into History

Day after day, some better than others, the members of the 301st fought, then consolidated what they had left or had recovered, then fought again. Their dead, of course, could not keep fighting, nor many of the wounded. Yet over and over they plunged in. First with 36 tanks, then with just over two dozen, then with only a bit more than a dozen. Their last attack, supporting a British unit, contained just a handful of survivors. But in the end, that barest scrap of a unit, of six (maybe eight) tanks, carried the U.S. Tank Corps forward into history.

Yet almost nobody today knows about any of this. Even the U.S. Army Center of Military History at Fort McNair in Washington, D.C., has nary an

image of the soldiers' exploits in combat, let alone personal accounts.

How did a third of the American tank force of World War I mostly disappear from the history books? Fighting under British command, for an Australian general, alongside two National Guard divisions that would exist only for months during both world wars, their story was lost.

While U.S. Army photographers with the American Expeditionary Forces took hundreds of pictures of light tanks fighting under U.S. command, photos of the Mark V and Mark V Star tanks driven by the soldiers of the 301st are almost accidental. Similarly, press coverage by American journalists was often limited to local stories filed upon the return and demobilization of soldiers who fought with the 301st, instead of contemporary accounts from the battlefield. In the end, the soldiers became America's "lost battalion" of tankers from World War I. ★

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# Will the Real MacArthur Please Wade Ashore?



# Viewpoints of Legendary General Differ

By Col. Cole Kingseed  
U.S. Army retired

It has been 75 years since Gen. Douglas MacArthur presided over the Japanese surrender in Tokyo Bay. Despite the considerable passage of time, the narrative surrounding MacArthur's contributions to Allied victory in the Pacific remains as it was in 1945: conflicted.

Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist and author David Halberstam characterizes MacArthur as “narcissist, brilliant, talented, petulant, manipulative, and given to remarkable mood swings.” At the same time, he opines that MacArthur was the most brilliant strategist in the American Army and a fearless warrior in battle. Another MacArthur biographer, D. Clayton James, alludes to the dichotomies by observing that no other figure in American military history has been the simultaneous subject of as much adulation and condemnation.

Wherein lies the truth? Who was the real MacArthur?

## Contemporaries' Views

MacArthur's contemporaries, such as Gens. Dwight Eisenhower and George Marshall, viewed the Pacific general as imperious, aloof and grandiose.

Marshall, in particular, regarded MacArthur as a political opportunist and overrated commander. But, as Army chief of staff, he understood President Franklin Roosevelt's support of MacArthur as a needed symbol of Allied resistance to the Japanese. So, it was Marshall who carefully drafted MacArthur's Medal of Honor citation for his defense of the Philippines in 1942—ensuring nothing would be noted about the troops he left in a perilous position while escaping Corregidor Island (at Roosevelt's behest) in the early stages of the war.

Marshall also never said an adverse word about MacArthur in front of the Army General Staff, though he later described MacArthur as “very difficult—very, very difficult at times—particularly when he was on a political procedure basis.”

For his part, Eisenhower worked for MacArthur seven years before World War II, first as an aide to Army Chief of Staff MacArthur and then as

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Gen. Douglas MacArthur returns to the Philippines at Leyte on Oct. 20, 1944.

U.S. ARMY



a senior adviser to MacArthur in the Philippines from 1935–39. One might expect a close relationship between the future theater commanders, given the proximity of their offices; in fact, the opposite was true. Their personalities and approaches to command were not conducive to a bond. As MacArthur biographer William Manchester summarizes: “Ike asked to be liked, and he was; MacArthur demanded that he be revered, and he wasn’t.”

### Detractors' Views

Foremost of those who portray MacArthur as an ineffective theater commander is author Eric Larrabee, who offers that MacArthur sometimes

gave the impression of having wandered into World War II by mistake. What was MacArthur’s contribution to the war? Not much, really, Larrabee states. MacArthur mishandled the defense of the Philippine Islands; he allowed the Far Eastern Air Force to be destroyed on the ground at Clark Field; he was slow to advance up the northern coast of New Guinea; and he was a late and somewhat resistant convert to the strategy of leapfrogging against Japanese-occupied islands.

Historian and author John McManus echoes Larrabee’s assessment of MacArthur in the opening stages of the Pacific war. McManus states that MacArthur’s transition into a wartime mentality was not swift and chastises the Southwest Pacific Area chief’s views as “myopic and self-interested.”

Historians Williamson Murray and Allan Millett also are critical of

MacArthur’s campaign to liberate the Philippines. Rather than focusing on the destruction of Japanese forces on Luzon, Murray and Millett state, MacArthur focused more on the capture of Manila, the political and cultural heart of the Philippines. Prodding his commanders to capture the Filipino capital by his birthday (Jan. 26, 1945), MacArthur underestimated the Japanese strength on Luzon. The subsequent battle of Manila proved one of the costlier victories of American arms in the Pacific.

MacArthur’s field commanders, Gens. Robert Eichelberger and Walter Krueger, also disparaged their chief. Eichelberger, who commanded Eighth U.S. Army, developed a healthy dislike of MacArthur, who he felt had denied him his place in history. Frequently confiding his frustrations in letters to his wife, Eichelberger wrote, “We have difficulty in following the satellites of MacArthur, for

Gen. Douglas MacArthur signs the Japanese Instrument of Surrender aboard the USS Missouri in Tokyo Bay on Sept. 2, 1945.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES

like those of Jupiter, we cannot see the moons on account of the brilliance of the planet [MacArthur].”

Commanding Alamo Force and eventually Sixth U.S. Army, Krueger disapproved of his chief’s operational plan once American forces landed on Luzon on Jan. 9, 1945. While MacArthur viewed Krueger’s operations as too slow and methodical, Krueger refused to be bullied into a faster pace. Krueger’s conclusion? The capture of Manila for MacArthur’s birthday was insufficient reason to risk a corps in a premature advance on the Philippine capital.

### MacArthur’s Defenders

In defense of MacArthur is Manchester, who writes that MacArthur “was the most gifted man-at-arms this nation has produced.” Still, Manchester notes, there is something disturbing about MacArthur’s “thespianism.” “What Douglas MacArthur believed in most was Douglas MacArthur,” Manchester states.

A more recent biographer, Geoffrey Perret, claims that to understand MacArthur, one must understand Thomas Carlyle’s dictum that history is created by the actions of great men. MacArthur’s only goal in life was to be numbered among the great. “History is merely the sum of their biographies,” MacArthur once told Philippine Commonwealth President Manuel Quezon. To be honored as a great man became the central obsession of MacArthur’s life.

Was MacArthur the greatest soldier in American history as Manchester claims? Not according to Perret. MacArthur was too difficult a subordinate to be an entirely successful commander. He created more headaches for his superiors, such as Roosevelt and Marshall, than a commander should, especially in time of war. At his best, Perret states, MacArthur was probably the second-greatest soldier in American history, second only to Ulysses Grant.

British historian John Keegan views

MacArthur’s advance to the Philippines as his crowning achievement as a strategist. MacArthur was not interested in liberating New Guinea for its own sake, but merely as a base of sufficient position to enable him to reach the Philippine archipelago. The ensuing campaign demonstrated lessons learned in joint operations.

Fortunately, MacArthur was well served by air and naval commanders Gen. George Kenney and Rear Adm. Thomas Kincaid. As long as they understood MacArthur’s quest for speed, MacArthur allowed considerable flexibility to his subordinate commanders. Kenney and Kincaid proved resourceful when MacArthur waded ashore at Leyte in the Philippines on Oct. 20, 1944.

Senior foreign officers also applauded MacArthur’s campaigns from New Guinea to the Philippines and on to Tokyo. Field Marshal Viscount Alanbrooke, chief of Britain’s Imperial General Staff and his country’s senior soldier, wrote in his diary that

MacArthur “outshone Marshall, Eisenhower, and all the other American and British generals including [Bernard Law] Montgomery.” War theorist B.H. Liddell Hart concurred: “MacArthur was supreme among the generals. His combination of strong personality, strategic grasp, tactical skill, operative mobility, and vision put him in a class above other allied commanders in any theater.”

### On Balance

In the final analysis, biographer James is close to the mark when he posits that MacArthur in World War II alternated and acted with strategic moves with brilliance and boldness on some occasions, yet displayed inexplicable hesitancy at other times. James says MacArthur was indeed a battle captain of inherent contradictions—personally brave to a fault but unwilling to share the limelight with subordinate commanders. Like Eisenhower, MacArthur was a late Victorian, a 19th century figure, with the same prejudices and

nationalistic tendencies of most Americans born near the outset of the 20th century.

MacArthur’s concept to defend the Philippines at the beaches certainly does not compel admiration, nor does his failure to stockpile provisions for defense of the Bataan Peninsula. His refusal to credit and give recognition to his subordinate commanders was inexcusable. MacArthur’s ego proved both his greatest strength as well as his greatest weakness. Moreover, subsequent campaigns in the Philippines following the capture of Luzon did little to contribute to the destruction of Japan’s ability to continue waging war.

Yet there remains little doubt that MacArthur provided the U.S. with its first hero on a national stage during the war. His campaign in the Southwest Pacific Area over thousands of miles, amid seemingly insurmountable logistical difficulties and against a determined enemy, is one of the great successes of American and Allied arms in World War II. MacArthur not only devised the strategy of the Southwest Pacific Area, but he also ensured support from senior American political and military leaders to accept his strategy.

Over the course of the war, MacArthur oversaw 87 amphibious landings, all of them successful, severing Japanese lines of communication and supplies and isolating enemy garrisons. Though island-hopping may not have been his original idea, he executed the Southwest Pacific campaign with boldness and dexterity. MacArthur’s crowning achievement was the re-conquest of the Philippine Islands, a fulfillment of a promise he made to the Filipino people in March 1942. And it was MacArthur, then Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, who accepted the unconditional surrender of Japan on Sept. 2, 1945, aboard the battleship Missouri.

It was MacArthur’s finest hour. ★

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MacArthur’s ego proved both his greatest strength as well as his greatest weakness.



# The Army and The Alamo

Quartermaster Use of Landmark Saved It From Destruction

By David McCormick

In 1836, reinforcements never arrived in time to save the defenders of the Alamo, but 10 years later, the U.S. Army came to the rescue and saved the venerated San Antonio structure from destruction.

It was in September 1846 that U.S. Army Quartermaster Maj. Charles Thomas assembled all the Army's equipment and provisions at the Alamo compound for Brig. Gen. John Wool's 3,400 troops amassing in San

Antonio on their way to fight in the Mexican-American War. Thomas saw the Alamo compound as the perfect site to concentrate the supplies and equipment required to outfit Wool's corps, but first, he contacted the Catholic bishop of Galveston, Texas, Jean-Marie Odin, to get permission to use the compound since the Alamo originally had been a mission church.

The church responded positively to the request, feeling the Army's pres-

ence would prevent the compound that was "grown over with weeds, moss and even shrubs growing out from the cracks in the walls," as a visitor noted, from falling into total disrepair. For most of the next three decades, the Army saved the Alamo from destruction.

In late September 1846, Wool departed San Antonio with a wagon train of 350 wagons carrying supplies needed for his trek to the Rio Grande and beyond. With his exit, the Alamo continued life as a depot that would serve Wool's troops' supply needs while they were in Mexico. Also, with Wool's departure, Assistant Quartermaster James Harvey Ralston took over the job from Thomas.

## Much-Needed Repairs

While ensconced in the Alamo compound, the Army realized major repairs had to be done to fit its supply needs. In the spring of 1847, work began to convert the dilapidated Alamo, which was filled with debris and had



crumbling walls and caved-in roofs, into storehouses for quartermaster property; ordnance property and medicine stores; forage houses; blacksmiths; carpenters and other workshops, according to the January 2015 edition of *Southwestern Historical Quarterly*.

But before repairs were undertaken, Ralston sent an estimate of \$3,258 to U.S. Army Quartermaster General Thomas Jesup for the sorely needed modifications. With no reply, Ralston went ahead with stop-gap repairs, saying thieves and damaging weather conditions had contributed to the loss of supplies. In atypical Army fashion, he apparently felt it prudent sans the official affirmative to proceed with the repairs.

With the termination of the war with Mexico, the Army's direction turned to policing the American West, with

Texas being the largest point of focus. "The Alamo ... if placed in a suitable state of repair would accommodate a regiment, and might at the same time be rendered a strong defensive work," Capt. George Hughes stated to the commander of the U.S. Corps of Topographical Engineers.

### Occupation Begins

With this, the Army began to occupy San Antonio. During the first half of 1849, companies from the 1st, 3rd and 8th Regiments took up quarters in San Antonio and environs. In March of that year, Chief Quartermaster brevet Maj. Edwin Burr Babbitt, in charge of the 8th Military Department (Texas), wrote Jesup with a rather costly proposal—\$1.1 million in today's dollars—to heighten the Army's military resources in San Antonio. As part of his plan he called for razing the Alamo site and building new upon it. Fortunately for the historic structure, Jesup replied, "The Alamo, if repaired, I think would furnish accommodations

for the force retained in San Antonio," according to the *Southwestern Historical Quarterly*.

With Jesup's response, the Army again saved the Alamo from destruction; not with any thought to its historic significance, but in efforts to save funds. And none too soon, with locals looking to reuse the stone from the crumbling structure for their own projects.

The first thing Babbitt had to do was to hammer out a new lease with the Catholic Church, the supposed owner of the Alamo. It was quite the process, with \$300 per month first demanded of the Army for leasing the former mission and all peripheral buildings. Odin's agent, Bryan Callaghan, stuck



Jesup

**Opposite:** This 1850 lithograph, based on a watercolor painted a few years before by Sgt. Edward Everett, depicts the ruins of the Alamo mission church during its use as a U.S. Army depot. **Above:** The Alamo Plaza in 1870.

OPPOSITE: UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS ARLINGTON LIBRARIES. ABOVE: TEXAS HISTORICAL COMMISSION



to his demand of \$300 per month for a one-year lease. Babbitt rebutted that, for such a short duration, the Army could not make any improvements, and under those terms, the site would be useless to the Army.

After much back and forth, the Army leased the Alamo complex for \$150 per month and would occupy it “so long as the U.S. Government may desire.” With this issue settled, Babbitt pushed ahead, securing the Alamo as the depot serving Western forts.

### Busy Depot

From July 1849 to June 1851, the U.S. Army quartermaster depot at the Alamo was in high gear. Thousands of dollars were expended to buy and ship enormous amounts of supplies. For example, during that period, Babbitt purchased 260,000 board feet of lumber and 320,000 shingles; \$99,000 was spent on 1,573 horses and mules; another \$71,000 was spent on corn and hay for the livestock. All of this was sent on to Army posts on the frontier. Babbitt spent another \$171,000 to transport 5.3 million pounds of freight from the Texas coast to San Antonio.

In December 1852, there was an in-

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The Alamo shown with its pediment familiar to Americans today. istock

terruption in the Alamo’s service as the Army’s supply depot, and for an odd reason. It was due to the health worry of the commander of the Army’s Department of Texas, brevet Maj. Gen. Persifor Smith. Smith had transferred his headquarters to Corpus Christi, Texas, in the belief that its seaside location would benefit his health. The headquarters move included transferring the Army’s San Antonio quartermaster depot from the Alamo to Corpus Christi. This proved a dismal failure.

Communication between Corpus Christi and other Army installations was problematic; the increased humidity of the coastal climate caused premature spoilage of foodstuffs; and the inspector general of the Army, Col. Joseph Mansfield, said the harbor to the port city was obstructed by a sandbar, hampering offloading of ships laden with cargo. These reasons prompted the return of the quartermaster depot to the Alamo in October 1855.

### Confederate Takeover

In 1861, Mansfield, in his role as inspector general, found the depot at the Alamo “all proper and correct,” according to the *Southwestern Historical Quarterly*. But that proved short-lived; in February 1861, Texas rebels seized the Alamo and continued to use it as a supply depot during the Civil War until

U.S. Army forces returned in August 1865. The year 1867 found the quartermaster depot at the Alamo again operating on all cylinders, serving dozens of Army posts on the Texas frontier.

### Move Completed

In 1875, plans were put into effect to move the quartermaster depot from the Alamo 2 miles northeast to a location known as Government Hill. When this was completed in 1877, the headquarters for the Army’s Department of Texas, as well as the quartermaster depot, with 1.1 million square feet of storage, were housed there. With this, the Army vacated the Alamo forever. The new complex on Government Hill became known as the Quadrangle and was the core of what would become Fort Sam Houston.

The Army’s efforts saved the Alamo for future generations—not for altruistic reasons, but for practical ones. The Army needed space, and with little in the way of funds for renovation, the Alamo met those needs for close to three decades. The Army’s association with the Alamo during those 30 years is the reason the Alamo stands today. ★

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David McCormick is a freelance writer. He formerly was employed by the city of Springfield, Massachusetts.

# VA Seeks to Serve Female Veterans

By Col. Robin Neumeier

**W**omen are the fastest-growing subpopulation of veterans, according to the Department of Veterans Affairs. And female veterans deserve and require qualified and available health care services as they transition from the military into the civilian sector.

But in the past, female veterans reported dissatisfaction in navigating and receiving female-specific care within VA health facilities due to the limited number of VA health care providers for women.

In response, the VA's Veterans Health Administration (VHA) created a mini-residency program on women's health geared toward VHA clinicians who are caring for more female veterans. Since beginning in 2008, over 7,500 clinicians have attended mini-residency programs to integrate women's health care into their practice with the intent to expand health care services for female patients.

Additionally, VHA developed musculoskeletal training for clinicians caring for female veterans because women's pain often presents differently to medical providers than male veterans', which can complicate medical diagnosis and treatment regimens.

## Reaching Out

VHA's initiatives to attract and retain female veterans as patients at VA health care centers include adding comprehensive primary care, gynecologic care, maternity benefits, infertility and adoption reimbursement services, mental health services and military sexual trauma counseling. Furthermore, in 2013, the VA developed a Women Veterans Call Center hotline to provide information about



VA services and resources for female veterans.

More women are choosing the VA for health care than ever, with women accounting for over 30% of the increase in veterans served over the past five years. The number of women veterans using VA health care services has tripled since 2000, growing from about 160,000 to over 500,000 in April 2019.

Still, of the approximately 20,000 women who transitioned from the military in 2018, only about 40% of them enrolled in the VHA, and only 22% used the VHA for medical services.

To educate transitioning female Air Force members while increasing their enrollment rates in the VHA, the Air Force's Women's Initiative Team partnered with the VHA in 2017 to create and implement a health information session exclusively for those women. Under the auspices of the Joint VA/DoD Health Executive Committee, which included the Transition Assistance Program senior steering group and VHA's Women Health Services,

the team collaborated to establish the Women's Health Transition Training pilot program. The goal of the pilot program was to provide transitioning military women with an understanding of the female health services offered within VHA facilities and of other VA services available, such as shelter, home loan and behavioral health.

## Focus on Well-Being

The Women's Health Transition Training pilot program's primary purpose is to educate women about VHA health care after leaving military service, show them how to enroll, and encourage them to embrace ownership of their self-care. The pilot

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A Department of Veterans Affairs health care provider consults with a patient in a new space at the VA's Ambulatory Care Center in Charleston, South Carolina. The space was created for privacy for the center's growing population of female veterans.

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS

program offers information to women with a focus on health and well-being.

The one-day program questions transitioning women regarding their health-seeking behaviors post-service and educates them regarding the health services available to them within the VA so they can make informed decisions regarding their health. The program consists of five phases:

- **Phase 1:** Shifting from active duty to veteran status.
- **Phase 2:** Understanding the VHA health system.
- **Phase 3:** Discussing women's health services available within the VHA.
- **Phase 4:** Learning how to enroll in the VHA.
- **Phase 5:** Using the Transition Assistance Program.

Measuring program success includes VA enrollment rates for women pilot participants; the time to enrollment from separation; VA health services utilization; changes in knowledge about, preparedness for and perceptions of the Women's Health Transition Training presentation; and satisfaction with the VA health system. The overwhelming success of the 18-month pilot program assisted in moving it from a pilot to a permanent program in fiscal 2020. It is available to female service members in all branches of the military.

### All in a Day's Training

During Women's Health Transition Training, the day focuses on and promotes information and education regarding access to care within the VHA system. Each participant receives an 88-page Women's Health Transition Training booklet, which provides in-depth information on topics discussed during the presentation. Additionally, the female veteran instructors discuss real and perceived struggles of transitioning to civilian life.

Training starts with participants answering a questionnaire about their understanding of what the VHA offers women, their perceptions of VA medical care and their preparedness to start enrollment in the VHA. Past results revealed that 82% of

participants wanted to learn more about health care options within the VHA. Pre- and post-session surveys showed knowledge about VHA services increased by 97%. Additionally, 60% of the women commented on how the women-only environment was perceived as a "safe place" to ask female-specific questions, to include questions about behavioral health.

The participant satisfaction rate hovers around 98%, and 97% of participants said they found the training resources useful and felt positive about getting their questions about VHA care answered. Although the statistics reveal a 125% increase in awareness regarding women's health services available within the VHA and a 98.5% preparedness for enrolling in the VHA, the real question remains whether this knowledge will be used to create actionable outcomes (i.e., VHA enrollment and VHA service utilization).

### Expanded Delivery Options

Due to the success of the Women's Health Transition Training pilot program, Congress requested all military branches offer the Women's Health Transition Training course to transitioning women starting in fiscal 2020. With expansion of the training, the plan is to increase the ways in which the information is delivered to meet the needs of transitioning women. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the course is delivered virtually in a variety of time slots to ensure women have the opportunity to attend. In-person sessions should resume later this year, and the virtual sessions will continue.

In fiscal 2021, ownership of the Women's Health Transition Training program will transfer from the VHA to the Veterans Benefits Administration's Office of Transition and Economic Development, which will maintain collaboration with the

VHA's Office of Women's Health Services and the Air Force's Women's Initiative Team to ensure the program stays on course as designed. This transfer also will ensure that the program meets the fiscal 2020 National Defense Authorization Act for Transition Assistance Program changes, receives appropriate fund-

ing necessary to remain successful, and acts as a foundation to build upon for other veteran subpopulations.

Each year, 200,000 Americans transition from the military, and every one of those military members has a story to tell that shapes them as the veterans they are today. The transition can be difficult for some. Culture and community support play a large role in how a veteran will transition as well as in their sense of belonging. The VA continues to make sig-

nificant changes to meet the needs of today's female veterans, which hopefully will shape tomorrow's veterans as strong, agile and healthy.

To learn more or to register for Women's Health Transition Training, visit [www.va.gov/womenvet/whtt/index.asp](http://www.va.gov/womenvet/whtt/index.asp) or search [info@whttforyou](mailto:info@whttforyou). ★

**Col. Robin Neumeier** is a U.S. Army Nurse Corps officer on a U.S. Army War College Fellowship at the Department of Veterans Affairs, Washington, D.C. Previously, she was deputy commanding officer and chief of clinical operations for the 30th Medical Brigade, Sembach, Germany. She has a Doctor of Nursing Practice degree from Old Dominion University, Virginia.

More women are choosing the VA for health care than ever, with women accounting for over 30% of the increase in veterans served over the past five years.

# Forecasting Future Fights

## Army Braces for Complex, Uncertain World

By Rick Maze  
Editor in Chief

**A** new report from the nonpartisan Rand Corp. attempts to look at the future of warfare and what it might mean for today's military.

Titled "Peering into the Crystal Ball: Holistically Assessing the Future of Warfare," the report by Rand experts says nations often guess wrong about what lies ahead. "Military history is littered with mistaken predictions about the future of warfare that have left forecasters militarily unprepared—sometimes disastrously so—for the conflicts ahead," the report states. "The United States has suffered its own share of bad predictions."

An oft-cited example is based on the widely used phrase, "No More Task Force Smiths," a reference to how the U.S. was unprepared when North Korean communist forces flowed south across the 38th Parallel on June 25, 1950, in aggressive action against the democratic Republic of Korea. The U.S. committed a small and understrength infantry battalion as a delaying action while waiting for a larger force to arrive by ship. Headed by Lt. Col. Charles Smith, a World War II combat veteran, the battalion was ordered to advance as far north as possible to delay the advancing North Korean People's Army. Armed mostly with World War II rifles, mortars and bazookas, and carrying only two days' worth of rations and a few hundred rounds each of ammunition, the infantrymen faced a force of about 5,000—including two infantry regiments and a tank regiment.

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Soldiers with the 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division, use a satellite communication system at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California.

U.S. ARMY/PFC. ROSIO NAJERA



They fought bravely for hours, delaying but not stopping the North Korean advance. Smith ordered a withdrawal, the only reasonable option, but it was not orderly as the surviving infantrymen, mostly on foot, were overrun. Outmanned and outgunned, they had held their ground for six hours. More than 180 were killed, captured or wounded. Some of the survivors did not reach safety for five days, as they fled to the south from what became known as the Battle of Osan.

### Global Challenges

The problem in predicting the future is failing to think big enough, the Rand report says. The experts suggest that what's needed is a comprehensive view that encompasses the increasingly accepted Multi-Domain Operations concept that conflict can involve land, air, sea, space and cyberspace and is influenced by economic, environmental and political factors. This impacts who, when, where and how war may be waged.

The world is complex, as the

geopolitical alignment continually changes. "None of these problems appear likely to be resolved anytime soon and will likely shape the contours of conflict in the years to come," the report says.

Great-power competition is a big focus because China and Russia are often viewed as economic and military rivals. Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping have both challenged U.S. global leadership at the same time the U.S. has relinquished some of its influence, especially in Europe. Rand cites increasing political polarization over defense and foreign policy issues as also undermining American influence.

While the U.S. is moving to withdraw combat forces from Afghanistan, Rand says Middle East turmoil remains. "Even after a decades-long international counterterrorism campaign, the Middle East remains afflicted with Islamic jihadist terrorism, systemic poor governance, economic issues, and growing ten-

sions between Iran and Saudi Arabia and between Iran and Israel that are already shaping conflicts in Syria, Yemen, and beyond,” the report says.

The U.K.’s split at the end of January from the European Union is another sign of global unease and insular thinking. It has become “more fractured, less interested in expeditionary operations, and increasingly inward looking, facing an immigration crisis, the growth of right-wing populism, and the lingering effects of the euro crisis,” Rand says.

The COVID-19 pandemic may also add to geopolitical and economic turmoil, though Rand’s report doesn’t raise this as a factor.

### Shrinking Lead

As documented in the Heritage Foundation’s annual Index of U.S. Military Strength and Global Firepower’s comparison of military capabilities, the U.S.’s dominance in conventional forces has been declining as other militaries spend more on modernization and their troops become more professional.

Rand predicts the U.S. won’t regain the lead. “The U.S. military will likely remain a fraction of the size it was during the Cold War, which was the last period of long-term, strategic competition, and it will lack the technological superiority it enjoyed during the immediate aftermath of the Persian Gulf War,” the report says. Russian and Chinese forces “are becoming increasingly capable,” and nations without the ability to widely modernize their military are making selective improvements such as the cyber and missile improvements of Iran and North Korea. There are global efforts to apply artificial intelligence in conventional and unconventional operations that provide competition to U.S. efforts, the report says.

The U.S. has long held an advantage in space-based assets for communication, intelligence and navigation, but the paper says Russia and China are prepared to disable and destroy satellites. There is also competition for space in space because of proliferation of commercial satellites.

Environmental changes—increasingly scarce water and increasing higher temperatures—affect economies, health and population movement and cause violence, especially but not solely in areas already prone to instability. Adding to the tension, sea levels could rise, forcing population movement that is expected to lead to more and larger urban areas and megacities.

The U.N. has predicted dramatic growth in megacities, with the expectation that more than 660 cities will have more than 1 million residents by 2030. That is a 30% increase. Preparing for urban warfare, the U.S. Army created simulated training centers with underground tunnels to prepare for combat operations in heavily populated environments.

In its predictions, the Rand report says the U.S. could need the capabilities to face multiple adversaries across multiple domains in three geographic areas at the same time. The current force simply isn’t large enough to do that, and prospects for near-term growth do not look strong.

“Despite the intention to focus elsewhere and on interstate competition and not terrorism, the Middle East remains the most likely—although not the most dangerous—place where the United States will need to fight wars in the future,” the report says.

“U.S. quantitative and qualitative military advantages are diminishing, and the United States will have increasing difficulty controlling strategic outcomes,” it says.

### Army Priorities

The Army is preparing for near-peer conflict with a list of more than 30 modernization priorities that include vertical lift, long-range precision fires, a next-generation combat vehicle, improved air and missile defense, improved networks and more lethal soldiers.

Army leaders have also expressed concern. Army Secretary Ryan McCarthy told the Senate Armed Services Committee that paying for modernization at a time of flat budgets has required assuming added risk by having a lower rate of growth

in troop levels. That isn’t a long-term solution, he said in written answers to senators’ questions. “The Army must grow to both meet current combatant commander demand and resource the new structure required to fight and win in the future,” he wrote in late March. A smaller Army would have difficulty fighting in three geographic areas at the same time.

There are some dramatic new capabilities that would make a difference, like hypersonic and supersonic missiles with offensive and defensive capabilities. “From an offensive perspective, we are placing significant emphasis and investment into our own hypersonic capability,” McCarthy said. “The current schedule of delivering a road mobile prototype hypersonic battery in fiscal year 2023 remains in place. From a defensive perspective, we must also attack the munition once launched.” The Army is evaluating use of the Patriot against supersonic cruise missile threats, he said.

The Army’s big transformation was launched two years ago, and McCarthy and Army Chief of Staff Gen. James McConville assured lawmakers they intend to finish what they started. Fiscal 2021, which begins Oct. 1, “marks a pivotal year,” they said, with momentum now established across priorities.

They said the Army is taking a “holistic” approach, although not in the same way the Rand report describes. For McCarthy and McConville, this means they are changing doctrine, improving equipment, organizing and training differently, transforming how they lead and manage people, and making certain facilities and infrastructure support the changes.

The Army is trying to pick up the pace of modernization by learning from past mistakes. McCarthy and McConville listed three major lessons. They must stay focused on the future threat. Before developing a timeline, they need to understand what is technologically feasible. Lastly, they need to remain fixed on the most needed capabilities, avoiding a requirements creep that has slowed past efforts. ★

# She's a Grunt, and She Wants More Women to Join Her

The years 1st Lt. Jessica Pauley spent as a member of speech and debate teams in high school and college may have helped prepare her to lead infantrymen, where the culture of competitive smack-talking is a tradition.

When the banter happens, she said, it's all "in an air of respect."

"We're all a bunch of grunts, and I make fun of myself all the time for being in the infantry," said Pauley, 28, the first woman in the Idaho National Guard to become an infantry officer. "It's easy to give each other a little bit of crap, but I think that that's what makes it normal and makes it feel like I belong."

DoD opened combat arms jobs to women at the start of 2016. As of May 1, there were 120 female officers and 481 enlisted women serving in infantry units in the Regular Army and Army National Guard, according to the deputy Army chief of staff for personnel.

Pauley wants other women to belong as well, even though the infantry never entered her mind during her studies at Boise State University, where she graduated from the ROTC program and was commissioned in 2018.

"It was kind of a shocker. Even all the way through two years in ROTC, I hadn't considered combat arms and didn't even put it on my list of branches," she recalled. Her choice was ordnance.

Nonetheless, Pauley eventually was commissioned in the infantry after having been influenced by a female NCO she met after graduation. The NCO was unable to join an infantry battalion in the Idaho National Guard, in part because there were no women in leadership positions yet, as required by the Army's Leaders First policy, Pauley said.

Without hesitation, and with the NCO's encouragement, Pauley decided



to switch branches so other women would have the opportunity to be infantry, too.

"I had to ask for it because they don't let you change [branches] lightly. It's that kind of deal," she said.

She made it through the hoops to switch to infantry, including an intensive interview with the Idaho National Guard's combined arms battalion commander. She then attended the Infantry Basic Officer Leader Course at Fort Benning, Georgia. She now leads a platoon in the Idaho National Guard's 2nd Battalion, 116th Cavalry Regiment.

Pauley enlisted in the Army on her 22nd birthday in December 2014 after two years studying health sciences in college. It wasn't the right fit. With friends already in the Guard, she took the plunge and "then my whole path changed from there; I was absorbed by the [Guard] life," she said.

"The Guard is basically like a family; people take care of each other, like a combat mentality, I guess, and there's

that other aspect of being involved in someone's civilian life," Pauley said.

After basic training, she trained at Fort Meade, Maryland, to be a public affairs specialist before deciding to go back to school. In ROTC, she found more of the fellowship she had enjoyed in the Guard.

Pauley doesn't feel special for having made it into the infantry; in fact, she feels she's barely gotten going on what she hopes will be a long career. She wants to go to Ranger School, go on deployments and use the skills she's been taught to see what she's made of.

Reporting to her unit was fraught with fear and apprehension, and she was warned that "combat arms guys can be a certain way." But Pauley found nothing but support from her leaders and acceptance from her men, confident that she's given the same opportunities male officers get.

She recalled thinking that the infantry "was not for me." Now, she's "just hoping that some more women will pick up the torch and join me."

"I didn't know what I was capable of until I did it, until someone who was in that role told me, 'You are capable of doing this,'" she said.

"I think it's just one of those things; it's the reputation of it as almost a bad thing, that it's the most physical branch or it's going to be so tough and women's bodies can't take it," Pauley said, positing that it is "these kinds of like mentalities" that scare women away. She's also sure "women might surprise themselves if they gave it a shot." —Gina Cavallaro ★

First Lt. Jessica Pauley is the first woman in the Idaho National Guard to become an infantry officer.

IDAHO ARMY NATIONAL GUARD/CRYSTAL FARRIS

# Segregated Unit Wins At Yechon

By Lt. Gen. Daniel Bolger  
U.S. Army retired



Most American soldiers have heard the grim story of Task Force Smith. On July 5, 1950, near Osan, South Korea, Lt. Col. Charles Bradford “Brad” Smith commanded a hasty defensive effort anchored by his understrength 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment. The young U.S. Army infantrymen and their supporting howitzer crews were quickly blown out of the way by advancing North Korean tanks and troops. American bravery couldn’t make up for lack of numbers, bazooka rounds bouncing off enemy T-34 tanks, a shortage of 105 mm artillery shells and worn-out machine-gun barrels. In years to come, Task Force Smith became U.S. Army shorthand for failure caused by unpreparedness. Say the name, and senior officers and NCOs shuddered. Nobody wanted to repeat that awful episode.

Seven decades later, Task Force Smith is a military horror story that happened to somebody else. But in the high summer of 1950, among the hot, barren hills of South Korea, Smith’s nightmare was shared by all too many Americans. North Korea’s massive invasion of June 25 caught the South Koreans flat-footed and stunned their U.S. allies. The smart set in America said the next war would be fought with atomic bombs delivered by gleaming B-29 bombers. Somebody forgot to tell the communist cadres in Pyongyang. They simply attacked in the old style—tanks, artillery and tough, pitiless foot soldiers. The weaker South Korean regiments reeled. Within days, the South’s capital of Seoul fell. The North estimated it would end the war before August.

## Stark Options

American atomic bombers were not the answer. By this time, North Korea’s backers in the Soviet Union also

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had nuclear weapons, and employing a U.S. A-bomb in Korea risked a response by the Soviets—maybe in Korea, or in American-occupied Japan, or against NATO countries in Europe, or worst of all, in the American homeland. So the options appeared stark. Fight or flight? Send in American forces—air, sea, ground—and hold the line? Or just let Moscow’s North Korean proxies take the South? Former World War I battery commander President Harry Truman never flinched. He ordered in U.S. troops.

And there it all went sideways.

Smith and his fellow battalion commanders in Japan never really expected to relive their World War II experiences. If a new conflict arose, weren’t the pilots supposed to drop the big one? Well, the pilots—Navy, Marine Corps and the new Air Force—would do their part, but not with atomic weapons. Somebody, though, had to go in on the ground. The first somebodies were the 540 soldiers of

Task Force Smith. They paid a high price and barely slowed the rampaging North Koreans.

More American battalions followed. Nobody made up catchy slogans about them. They’re the ones we do not remember. But we should.

American infantry regiments in Japan manned only two battalions, a cost-cutting measure that seemed shortsighted in light of what happened in Korea. Smith’s parent 24th Infantry Division fed all six line battalions into action. The North Koreans chewed through each one, smashing in turn each unit of the 34th Infantry Regiment and the 19th Infantry Regiment, then pinning the remnants and the division headquarters in the road junction of Taejon by mid-July. The beleaguered Americans needed help, and they needed it immediately.

The 25th Infantry Division followed the 24th into Korea. Two of the three infantry regiments—the 27th and 35th—each had only a pair of line

battalions. But the 25th Infantry Division’s other regiment stood at full strength with three complete battalions. You’d think that desperate American commanders in Korea would be thrilled to get that well-manned contingent. In fact, few wanted it at all.

The 24th Infantry Regiment indeed brought all three battalions into the fight. Yet the regiment didn’t come well regarded. It was a segregated outfit. African American enlisted men and junior officers served under white senior officers.

Some might note that Truman ordered desegregation in Executive Order 9981 on July 26, 1948. Former National Guard Capt. Truman issued his bold order. But the U.S. Army de-

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**Opposite:** Soldiers with the 24th Infantry Regiment move to the front lines in Korea in July 1950. **Above:** A U.S. Army artillery crew fires a 105 mm howitzer against North Korean positions.

OPPOSITE: NATIONAL ARCHIVES. ABOVE: DoD

cided how to carry it out. There were a lot of senior Southerners in the U.S. Army, and they moved rather deliberately. General of the Army Douglas MacArthur's mother was a Virginian whose brothers wore Confederate gray; he commanded the entire Northeast Asian Theater. Lt. Gen. Walton Walker's grandfathers fought for the South; he commanded Eighth U.S. Army, the field headquarters in Korea. Gen. J. Lawton Collins came from New Orleans; he was the U.S. Army chief of staff. Gen. Omar Bradley hailed from rural Missouri; he served as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Rapid desegregation was not a priority.

In the view of many higher officers, the 25th Infantry Division was integrated, after a fashion. It amounted to integration at the unit level. After all, the 25th had one black infantry regiment, the only such organization in all of Occupied Japan. That's a big reason why the 24th Infantry Regiment comprised three full battalions. All those black soldiers assigned to Japan had to go somewhere. Now they went to Korea.

In the convoluted logic of the era, the segregated 24th Infantry Regiment could only work with other such units. So the segregated 512th Military Police Company, the segregated 77th Engineer Company and the segregated 159th Field Artillery Battalion joined the 24th Infantry Regimental Combat Team. Generals hesitated to task-organize any other organizations with the 24th Regimental Combat Team. So much for unit-level integration.

### Companies Reshuffled

The regiment's white colonel added to the confusion. He insisted that no black officer would command white officers. Thus companies were reshuffled as the regiment deployed to battle. All these machinations added to the same problems that faced Task Force Smith: worn-out weapons, am-



**Top:** American troops fire their 105 mm howitzer at Yongdok, Korea, in July 1950.

**Above:** Wounded soldiers are treated at an aid station in Korea.

TOP: U.S. ARMY CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY. ABOVE: NATIONAL ARCHIVES

munition shortages and an aggressive, powerful enemy.

The senior officers figured the 24th Regimental Combat Team would stumble. After all, the white regiments didn't do all that well. But the 24th was next in line, and that settled it. With all other battalions committed, on July 20, 1950, the 25th Infantry Division sent the 3rd Battalion, 24th Infantry Regiment, forward to confront the North Koreans at Yechon.

By midmorning, trucks dropped off the African American riflemen west of Yechon, a ramshackle little town like a hundred others in South Korea. The North Koreans wanted this one. They needed it to keep pushing south. The 24th had to stop them. Battery B of the artillery battalion emplaced its howitzers 2 miles west of the infantry. It was the Task Force Smith drill again. No generals up at headquarters expected it to work.



The soldiers near Yechon thought otherwise.

Company L moved toward Yechon, clearing hovels. A watchful North Korean element opened fire with rifles and a mortar. The American riflemen returned fire and called for their own mortars and artillery. Battery B opened up. Meanwhile, the rest of the battalion arrived by truck and joined the advance.

### Not Pretty

One North Korean element had a good line of fire on the U.S. infantrymen. Alert soldiers of the engineer company, led by their equally savvy com-

mander, 1st Lt. Charles Bussey, knew what to do. He and his engineers wrestled two heavy .50-caliber machine guns to the crest of a key overlook and opened fire.

As Bussey later recalled, the African American machine gunners “chopped the North Koreans to pieces.” It wasn’t pretty. It never is. “I was ashamed of the slaughter before me,” Bussey said, “but this was my job, my duty, and my responsibility.” First Sgt. Roscoe Dudley and the other engineers counted 258 enemy dead. Bussey’s initiative and courage earned him the Silver Star.

The afternoon firefight west of Ye-

chon sputtered on until dusk. The Americans pulled back from the town and dug in. North Korean rifle shots and mortar fire went on all night. Battery B replied with 750 105 mm rounds, igniting the ruins of several structures in Yechon. One American forward observer was killed in action during the overnight fighting.

At 5 a.m., African American Capt. Bradley Biggs led his Company L soldiers right into Yechon. As he said, “We moved out on the double.” From high ground flanking the battered town, African American Capt. Thurston Jamison and his Company I riflemen banged away as hostile infantry and machine-gun teams tried to back away from Company L’s attack. In an hour, it was over. The North Koreans fled. That didn’t happen much in July 1950. In fact, it had not happened so far.

### Good News Fades

Up at Eighth Army headquarters, the public affairs team jumped on the victory. Associated Press reporter Tom Lambert made it into the area right after the clash. He sent out a solid account that ran in numerous American papers, including *The New York Times*. Unfortunately for the soldiers of the 24th Regimental Combat Team, bad news sells papers. There was way too much of that in July 1950. The Yechon story faded, swamped by the continuing litany of U.S. reverses in Korea.

To this day, we’re not sure of the North Korean losses beyond those buried by Bussey’s engineers. The 24th Regimental Combat Team suffered two killed and 12 wounded, a high price for possession of a wrecked crossroads. But a win is a win. Seventy years later, it’s a reminder that despite every reason in the world to get it wrong, the soldiers of the 24th Infantry Regimental Combat Team got it right when it counted most. ★

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An honor guard formed by the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment, conducts a ceremony at the original Task Force Smith memorial in Korea.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES

# Planning For Deadly Germs Began Decades Ago

By Brig. Gen. John Brown  
U.S. Army retired

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Brig. Gen. John Brown, U.S. Army retired, served 33 years in the Army, with his last assignment as chief of military history at the U.S. Army Center of Military History. The author of *Kevlar Legions: The Transformation of the United States Army, 1989–2005*, he has a doctorate in history from Indiana University.

**T**he U.S. Army has had ample experience dealing with infectious diseases. Worldwide operations have exposed soldiers to many pathogens, and the service has had to address them at the tactical, operational, strategic and grand strategic levels of war. This article focuses on the grand strategic level, drawing on Army experiences in the Cold War to do so.

Strategy acquires, distributes and employs national assets through operations (campaigns) and tactics (battles) to achieve national policy objectives. Grand strategy transcends strategy and employs all instruments of power on the broadest scale. It weds military affairs with economics and diplomacy, almost inevitably involves alliances, and in modern times has been global. For all its scale and complexity, it often can be expressed in simple terms. The Allied grand strategy for World War II was “Germany First,” for example, and for the Cold War it was “containment.”

Before the Cold War, grand strategy did not particularly have a medical component. Nations tried to keep their armed forces and populations as healthy as possible, of course, but this did not determine strategy and was subordinate to it. With the Cold War, this changed for two reasons: the growing concern with bioweapons as a strategic threat, and the prolonged intermingling of international forces dependent upon each other for medical assets.

## NATO Takes Lead

The principal venue wherein medicine as grand strategy initially developed was NATO. The U.S. Army took the lead for NATO within the U.S. armed forces. The Navy and Marine Corps had centers of gravity in the Pacific, and the Air Force prioritized strategic forces. The task of shielding the vast populations of free Europe fell to the Army and its allied counterparts, assisted by the other services. Most U.S. forces committed to Europe were

soldiers, and the Supreme Allied Commander Europe was, with one exception, a U.S. Army general throughout the Cold War.

The greatest threat to U.S. Army and NATO forces and populations came from weapons of mass destruction. These included biological weapons. By the mid-1950s, anthrax, botulism, bubonic plague, brucellosis, encephalomyelitis, tularemia and vaccinia had become weaponized. “B,” for biological, became a prominent member of such Cold War acronyms as ABC (atomic, biological and chemical) and later NBC (nuclear, biological and chemical) to describe “megadeath” methods of warfare. Megadeath is defined as using 1 million deaths as a unit of measurement. Pathogens escaped the realm of doctors and nurses to enter the lexicon of strategic planners as well. Unlike nuclear and chemical weapons, biological weapons could be used surreptitiously and with a greater prospect of avoiding accurate attribution.

## Staying in the Fight

The Army developed methods and means to survive and continue operations in the face of weapons of mass destruction. One initiative was the pentomic division. Another was the U.S. Army Medical Unit of 1956–69, which grew from the U.S. Army Biological Warfare Laboratories (1943–69) and evolved into the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID, 1969–present). The pentomic division was to be sufficiently nimble and well informed by battlefield intelligence to avoid contamination. The Army Medical Unit was to develop the science to survive it if the contamination was biological. The Army Medical Unit pioneered with respect to biosafety, biocontainment, decontamination, biological surveillance and the development of rapid-response teams appropriately equipped to manage, treat and evacuate contaminated casualties.



The Army Medical Unit provided the science at the pinnacle of a pyramid that reached deep into the U.S. Army. Every company-sized unit had an NBC officer. This was generally an additional duty, so thousands of lieutenants cycled through multiweek NBC courses, returned to their units, and became responsible for training and preparing for NBC warfare. As they rose in rank, they managed NBC preparations of increasing breadth and scale. The emphasis was nuclear and chemical, but enough attention was given to biological threats to impart a working knowledge. Wedded to medical assets already arrayed for traditional purposes, the NBC structure enhanced capabilities to identify, contain, treat and decontaminate pathogens whether naturally or artificially introduced.

### Allied Involvement

These preparations became grand strategic because of the numerous allies involved. The Cold War defense of West Germany has been aptly described as a “layer cake.” Running from north to south, national sectors stacked one on top of the other. Flags changed nine times between the Baltic and the Swiss border. Reinforce-

ments, including the entire French army, would feed into the rear of one or more of six national armies depending on circumstances. Alliance-wide protocols with respect to command and control, tactics, logistics, medical support and more were necessary.

NATO developed standardization agreements (now dubbed STANAGs) to assure the interoperability of its diverse forces on common battlefields. It established a Military Standardization Agency in 1951. That organization and its successors negotiated hundreds of agreements covering numerous subjects to bring the allies to common standards with respect to logistics, equipment and performance. Many of these dealt with NBC and medical issues. The U.S. Army played a central role in the development of NBC and medical STANAGs. One end state was a common vision across the alliance with respect to identifying, containing, treating and decontaminating pathogens. Allied officers routinely attended U.S. Army schools, and U.S. officers routinely attended or taught at NATO schools.

A NATO force structure relevant to NBC warfare emerged. Within Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, the Programmes and Re-

quirements Branch, headed by a U.S. Army brigadier general, partnered with representatives from NATO headquarters to negotiate with the defense ministries of individual allied nations. Their objective was to assure a mix of forces from each nation that best met the needs of the alliance as a whole. The process was cyclic and methodical, involved bilateral and multilateral negotiations, and generally achieved a shared vision of “what right looked like” in time to accommodate national budget cycles. Nations funded their own forces.

The force structure developed by NATO force planning was balanced, weighted to the economic means of participating nations, and capable of meeting agreed planning scenarios. Some scenarios featured biological warfare. Within assigned front-line sectors, nations were largely autonomous, but as operations became fluid,

**Above left:** Scientists work at the U.S. Army Biological Warfare Laboratories at Camp Detrick, Maryland, circa 1946.

**Above right:** Army ROTC nurses wear protective masks during chemical warfare training at Camp Perry, Ohio, in 1986.

ABOVE LEFT: U.S. ARMY. ABOVE RIGHT: NATIONAL ARCHIVES

## HISTORICALLY SPEAKING

“mixing and matching” was expected to occur. Few nations had “framework” divisions or corps with command, control and communications and logistics capable of sustaining multinational contingents, but all could contribute to one. Appropriate “plug-ins” went into the “cupboard” to serve when needed.

In the case of biological warfare, specialized NBC units, medical facilities capable of containment, decontamination (and shower) units, medical evacuation units and water purification units would be in particular demand. Such units would be interoperable across NATO, allowing them to surge where needed.

Biological warfare would target civilians and soldiers alike. West Germany, Denmark and Norway would have gone under martial law once hostilities began. Procedures for civil defense and mobilizing civilian assets for the war effort were carefully thought out and generally familiar. Front-line status implied social discipline. The U.S. Army conducted training in sectors it was intended to defend and studied responsibilities it would share with local civil authorities for the people who lived there. Given warning, an evacuation of U.S. dependents was anticipated, but a general evacuation was not. Local civilians would largely stay in place and were to be prepared for pathogens of whatever origin.

### Humanitarian Relief

The Army Medical Unit and USAMRIID focused on Soviet biological warfare capabilities but canvassed worldwide for potential diseases. In this they were considerably assisted by knowledge NATO allies had of former colonies. USAMRIID was drawn into humanitarian relief efforts, given its special knowledge and capabilities. An example was assistance to Egypt when



Rift Valley fever broke out there in 1978. Activity in distant theaters advanced notions of global surveillance, having personnel deployed at outposts to pick up early warning of potential pandemics. Weapons of mass destruction defenses developed with NATO in mind migrated worldwide. South Korea, for example, adopted them in concert with Eighth U.S. Army.

### Benign End

Fortunately, the Cold War ended benignly. The Biological Weapons Convention, which went into force in March 1975, took much of the edge off the threat of bioweapons. Bioterrorism remained, as did the risk an adversary might cheat on the convention. Additional arms control agreements and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union further diminished concerns about weapons of mass destruction. Strategic emphasis shifted from a mammoth confrontation with a peer adversary to lesser risks posed by rogue states, terrorism and failed states. Within NATO, a concern for medical interoperability remained, as demonstrated by the alliance maintaining sizable forces healthy in such a pestilential environment as Afghanistan for almost 20 years. However, biological warfare and the means to face

it faded from the view of all but a few specialists.

Cold War preparations for biological warfare were not fruitless. Public health procedures that once were to be enforced by lines of command are still advocated, albeit encouraged by lines of coordination instead. Military attention to the subject probably deepened general understanding. It may be no accident that populations that have fared best in the current crisis include those of such Cold War front-line states as Denmark, Germany, Norway, South Korea and Taiwan. Beyond that, techniques, equipment and science pioneered by the Army Medical Unit and then USAMRIID are visible in the battle against COVID-19, whether employed by the U.S. or by others. As bad as things seem, they could have been worse if someone had not been thinking about this kind of threat for some time.

Whatever the actual fingerprints of U.S. Army Cold War preparations for biological warfare on the current crisis may be, they offer an example of a grand strategy directed at a biological threat. The resources of many nations were to be mobilized and coordinated for a common purpose. There may be lessons of interest here, whether dealing with this pandemic or the next. ★

## ADDITIONAL READING

Friedman, Norman, *The Fifty-Year War: Conflict and Strategy in the Cold War* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2000)

Gaddis, John Lewis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997)

*NATO Handbook* (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1995)

Researchers use black light to detect the presence of fluid containing a simulated Ebola virus on protective equipment during training at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington.

U.S. ARMY

# Esper: Military Will Operate Under a ‘New Normal’

Plans to operate under a “new normal” are taking shape across the Army and the rest of the military as the force continues to grapple with the challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic, Defense Secretary Mark Esper said.

“The long-term view is what do we do over the next six, 12, 18 months,” Esper said during a virtual event hosted by the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C. “My view, the view of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the view of our commanders, is there will be a new normal that we will have to adapt to for a certain period of time.”

This period could last until a vaccine “we are confident in” is developed and available, Esper said.

Since the start of the COVID-19 crisis, tens of thousands of troops have been mobilized to help local and state response efforts. Troops are helping distribute food, support overwhelmed hospital staffs and more.

The military also has fought to contain the spread of the virus in its ranks, implementing travel restrictions and other measures to protect service members, civilian employees and their families.

But the military also hasn’t stopped training, Esper said. Training is happening at the small-unit level, and leaders have adjusted and implemented safety measures based on the needs of each service, he said. DoD also is expanding its testing capacity and working to determine which units should be tested first.

“The challenge here is each service is different,” Esper said. “Each training area is different. Each training scenario is different.”

One of the challenges that commanders face is transmission of the virus by asymptomatic carriers. “We’re experiencing very high rates in the military when it comes to asymptomatic transmissions,” Esper said.



The Army continued home-station training as procedures were put in place to detect symptoms among soldiers in smaller units, but a “tactical pause” on collective training was put in place in March, Army Chief of Staff Gen. James McConville said.

“We didn’t want to bring people from all over the country into one area while the [virus] curve is where it’s at,” McConville said. Even with the curve beginning to flatten, he said, there is still an obligation to “protect the force so we can protect the nation. We’re looking at procedures and processes that we can put in place to safeguard the units that come to the training centers and still accomplish the training that we need to.”

The 4th Security Force Assistance Brigade of Fort Carson, Colorado, was slated to be the first unit to return to collective training with a rotation at the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana, in June, in advance of its fall deployment to Afghanistan, according to the U.S. Army Forces Command.

Some 800 officers and NCOs from the unit were to undergo testing before, during and after the JRTC rota-

tion, then undergo a 14-day lockdown before returning to duty.

Esper said training cannot come to a standstill, and the military must remain vigilant. “The world remains a dangerous place,” he said, adding that “we’re still seeing all the same bad behavior we saw before” from America’s adversaries and competitors.

“My watchword to the force is to remain vigilant,” Esper said. “These are uncertain times, we don’t know how states or militaries will act, so we have to remain vigilant out there on the front lines.”

## Cadet Summer Training Canceled

Cadet Summer Training, the Army’s largest annual training event, will not take place this summer at Fort Knox, Kentucky, because of the COVID-19 pandemic, officials announced.

Instead, much of the training will be delayed until the fall semester, and the Army will conduct a “distributed exe-

Soldiers with the 95th Adjutant General Battalion, 434th Field Artillery Brigade, Fort Sill, Oklahoma, stand in formation during basic combat training reception.

U.S. ARMY/SGT. DUSTIN BIVEN

## Transitions

### GENERAL OFFICER CHANGES\*

Major General: **Christopher Donahue** from commander, Special Operations Joint Task Force-Afghanistan, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan/Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan, Resolute Support Mission, Operation Freedom's Sentinel, Afghanistan, to commanding general, 82nd Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, N.C.

**Scott Efflandt** from deputy commanding general, III Corps, Fort Hood, Texas, to commanding general, 1st Armored Division and Fort Bliss, Texas.

**Sean Gainey** from deputy director, Force Protection, J8, Joint Staff, Washington, D.C., to director, Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems Office; and director of fires, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, U.S. Army, Washington, D.C.

**Diana Holland** from commanding general, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, South Atlantic Division, Atlanta, to commanding general, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Mississippi Valley Division, Vicksburg, Miss.

**David Isaacson** from director, Architecture, Operations, Networks and Space, Office of the Chief Information Officer/G-6, U.S. Army, Washington, D.C., to chief of staff, U.S. Cyber Command, Fort Meade, Md.

**David Ling**, U.S. Army Reserve, from assistant deputy chief of staff, G-4 (Troop Program Unit), Mobilization and Training, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-4, Washington, D.C., to commanding general (Troop Program Unit), 79th Theater Sustainment Command, Los Alamitos, Calif.

**Patrick Matlock** from commanding general, 1st Armored Division and Fort Bliss, deployed as deputy chief of staff, Operations, Resolute Support Mission, NATO; deputy commanding general (Operations), U.S. Forces-Afghanistan; and commander, U.S. National Support Element Command-Afghanistan, to director, Operations, U.N. Command/Combined Forces Command/U.S. Forces Korea, Republic of Korea.

**Terrence McKenrick** from commanding general, First Army Division East, Fort Knox, Ky., to deputy commanding general, V Corps, Fort Knox.

**Jeffrey Milhorn** from commanding general, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, North Atlantic Division, Brooklyn, N.Y., to deputy commanding general for military and international operations, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Washington, D.C.

**Andrew Rohling** from deputy commanding general, U.S. Army Europe, Germany, to commanding general, U.S. Army Africa/Southern European Task Force, Italy.

**Richard Toy** from commanding general, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Mississippi Valley Division, Vicksburg, to chief of staff, U.N. Command, Republic of Korea.

Brigadier General: **George Appenzeller** from commanding general, Regional Health Command-Central, Joint Base San Antonio, to director, health care operations, Defense Health Agency, Falls Church, Va.

**Shan Bagby** from deputy commanding general (Support), U.S. Army Medical Command/Chief,

Continued on next page

cution" of the training on university campuses across the country, according to the U.S. Army Cadet Command.

"CST 2020 planning is in progress, and all appropriate measures are being undertaken to ensure the health and safety of our cadets, cadre and civilians," Maj. Gen. John Evans, commander of Cadet Command, said. "The situation regarding the pandemic is still evolving, and because of this, plans for CST 2020 have been adjusted so we can still meet all of our training requirements."

The changes will not hinder any cadet's ability to move forward in ROTC, Evans said.

Army ROTC produces about 70% of officers entering the Army each year and is available on nearly 1,000 college campuses nationwide.

Every year, over 100 days, about 10,000 cadets from across the country descend on Fort Knox for Basic or Advanced Camp, according to the Army.

Basic Camp focuses on basic military training and discipline. Advanced Camp is a 37-day event that focuses on platoon-level operations.

Most Advanced Camp tasks will now take place via on-campus training and a rigorous task force-level off-campus field training exercise during the fall and spring semesters, Cadet Command said. The exercises will take place on major installations and be certified by each brigade commander.

For cadets graduating at the end of the 2021 academic year, tasks that cannot be trained on campus, such as employing a hand grenade and a buddy team live-fire exercise, will be done during a separate two-week course.

Cadets scheduled to attend Basic Camp this summer will receive an additional program of instruction on campus before the fall semester.

Senior cadets who have completed all other commissioning requirements except Cadet Summer Training will not be required to attend training at Fort Knox, and they will commission on time, officials said.

"One of our main focuses remains to develop leaders by accessing, training and educating," Evans said. "The decision to adjust the implementation

100 YEARS AGO IN

## INFANTRY JOURNAL

In the July 1920 edition of *Infantry Journal*, the forerunner of *ARMY* magazine, an article discussed the advantages of self-loading automatic and machine rifles. None have been adopted by or issued to the Army. While firepower would increase, soldiers would have to carry more weight because the faster rate of firing would likely result in carrying more ammunition.



of summer camps will allow leaders to focus on setting conditions so movement and training can be conducted in a safe manner in the future."

## BRIEFS

### Medal of Honor Recipient Dies

Medal of Honor recipient and former Green Beret Staff Sgt. Ronald Shurer II died May 14 after a long battle with lung cancer. He was 41.

His death was announced by the Army and the Secret Service, where he had worked since leaving the Army in 2009.



Shurer

Army Chief of Staff Gen. James McConville called Shurer his hero.

"Every generation has its heroes and Medal of Honor recipient, SSG (R) Ron Shurer is one of mine," McConville wrote on Twitter and Facebook. "I'm heartbroken at Ron's passing. He was a humble warrior who put others before himself. I join every member of the Army team in wishing the Shurer Family my deepest sympathies."

Shurer was awarded the Medal of Honor on Oct. 1, 2018, for his actions on April 6, 2008, in Afghanistan.

He had first been awarded a Silver

Star, but it was upgraded after a Pentagon review.

Shurer was the only medic with Operational Detachment Alpha 3336 on a mission to capture or kill members of the Hezb-e-Islami group when they were ambushed on a mountainside in Shok Valley by some 200 militant fighters. Shurer treated casualties as he moved up the mountain to where the rest of the American fighters were pinned down.

Shurer “took off through a hail of bullets and began scaling the rock face to get to the casualties,” his citation says. He treated one U.S. soldier who had been struck in the neck by shrapnel, then continued several hundred meters more under fire, killing insurgents along the way to reach the site of the ambush.

He is credited with treating four critically wounded American soldiers and 10 Afghan commandos. He was shot in the helmet and arm but continued moving through heavy fire to provide treatment to casualties over more than five hours.

Shurer then directed their evacuation down a steep cliff, President Donald Trump said at the White House Medal of Honor ceremony.

“We stand in awe of your father’s courage,” Trump said, addressing Shurer’s sons, Cameron and Tyler, who watched the ceremony with their mother, Miranda.

Trump also noted that Shurer had been diagnosed with lung cancer the year before. “He’s been fighting it every single day with courage and with strength, just like he faced every single battle in his life.”

### Special Forces Icon Dies

Retired Maj. Gen. Victor Hugo, a combat veteran with service in Vietnam and Korea and a lifetime member of the Association of the U.S. Army, died May 11. He was 88.

A 1954 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, New York, Hugo’s first assignment was to the CIA as a case officer for unconventional warfare and paramilitary actions in Vietnam.

After completing Special Forces qualification in 1962, Hugo was as-

signed to the 1st Special Forces Group on Okinawa, Japan. During his time there, Hugo planned and implemented



Hugo

a mandatory area study program for teams deploying to Vietnam and developed an attack assessment matrix that provided indicators to Special Forces teams of im-

pending attacks.

Hugo was next assigned to the Pentagon until he was deployed again to Vietnam in 1968. After another stint at the Pentagon, Hugo commanded the 38th Air Defense Artillery Brigade at Osan Air Force Base in South Korea.

Hugo returned to the Washington, D.C., area and served at Army headquarters before taking on his final assignment as commanding general of the 32nd Army Air Defense Command in Darmstadt, Germany.

### New AUSA Book for Army Families

A new book published by the Association of the U.S. Army captures the cultural essence of the Army with a guide to everything from flag etiquette, uniforms and rank insignia to place cards, protocol and pleasantries.

Compiled and written by Ginger Perkins, *Customs, Courtesies and Traditions of the United States Army: A Primer for Family Members* is a comprehensive reference book aimed at bringing spouses, parents, siblings, family members and friends closer to the bigger Army family by explaining their soldier’s world.

Perkins, who dedicated her 38 years as an Army spouse to learning and sharing what she knows about military protocol with other spouses, said the book “is for family members and anyone interested in this great Army, whether they have a soldier or not.”

“I love tradition, and I value the culture” of the Army, said Perkins, who, with her husband, retired Gen. David Perkins, is an Army parent. She previously co-authored *The Army Spouse Handbook*.

*Customs, Courtesies and Traditions*, she said, “is a way of reach-

## Transitions (continued)

Dental Corps, Joint Base San Antonio, to commanding general, Brooke Army Medical Center/Chief, Dental Corps, Joint Base San Antonio.

**Christopher Barra**, U.S. Army Reserve, from chief of staff (Troop Program Unit), 311th Sustainment Brigade (Expeditionary), Los Angeles, to deputy commanding general—Support (Troop Program Unit), 63rd Readiness Division, Mountain View, Calif.

**Brian Bisacre** from commandant, U.S. Army Military Police School, U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center of Excellence, Fort Leonard Wood, Mo., to deputy chief of staff, G-3/5/7, U.S. Army Reserve Command, Fort Bragg.

**Timothy Brennan**, U.S. Army Reserve, from deputy commanding general—Support (Troop Program Unit), 99th Readiness Division, Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, N.J., to commander (Troop Program Unit), 353rd Civil Affairs Command, Staten Island, N.Y.

**Larry Burris Jr.** from deputy commanding general (Support), 3d Infantry Division, Fort Stewart, Ga., to director, CJ3, Combined Joint Task Force—Operation Inherent Resolve, Operation Inherent Resolve, Iraq.

**Robert Cooley Jr.**, U.S. Army Reserve, from commander (Troop Program Unit), 353rd Civil Affairs Command, Staten Island, to chief of staff (Individual Mobilization Augmentee), U.S. Army Reserve Command, Fort Bragg.

**Jack Davis** from deputy commanding general, Regional Health Command-Pacific; senior market manager, Hawaii Enhanced Multi-Service Market; and chief, Army Nurse Corps, Honolulu, to commanding general, Regional Health Command-Pacific; and chief, Army Nurse Corps, Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Wash.

**Robert Davis** from senior defense official and attache, U.S. Defense Attache Office, China, to chief of staff, U.S. Army Central, Shaw Air Force Base, S.C.

**David Doyle** from deputy commanding general (Support), 82nd Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, to commanding general, Joint Readiness Training Center and Fort Polk, La.

**Patrick Frank** from commanding general, Joint Readiness Training Center and Fort Polk, to chief of staff, U.S. Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Fla.

**John Hafley**, U.S. Army Reserve, from commander (Troop Program Unit), 11th Military Police Brigade, Los Alamitos, to deputy commanding general—Support (Troop Program Unit), 88th Readiness Division, Fort Snelling, Minn.

**Wendy Harter** from commanding general, Brooke Army Medical Center; deputy commanding general, Regional Health Command-Central; and market manager, San Antonio Military Health System, to commanding general, Regional Health Command-Central, Joint Base San Antonio.

**Heidi Hoyle** from commandant, U.S. Army Ordnance School, U.S. Army Sustainment Center of Excellence, Fort Lee, Va., to commanding general, Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command, Scott Air Force Base, Ill.

Continued on next page

ing out to society.” The 70-page book is organized in an easy A-to-Z format where readers can learn about almost anything they’d want to know about the Army. This includes what forms of identification they need to gain access to a post if they’re attending an event, how to understand deployment orders, what a soldier’s shoulder patches and tabs mean, and when to stand during a military ceremony.

“We value our members, and not all members of AUSA have served in the Army; we want to share that pride and knowledge that we have about the Army with them, especially parents of soldiers and entry-level spouses,” said Patty Barron, director of AUSA’s Family Readiness directorate, who’s

also an Army spouse. “This [book] was a labor of love.”

### Field Artillery Changes Urged

To achieve domination during large-scale combat operations, the Army must change the way it controls and employs its field artillery battalions, according to a recent paper published by the Association of the U.S. Army.

The paper, “Massed Fires, Not Organic Formations: The Case for Returning Field Artillery Battalions to the DIVARTY,” describes the advantages of having field artillery battalions controlled by a division artillery headquarters—or DIVARTY—instead of brigade combat teams.

“If the joint force is to mass fires

against a peer adversary, centralized control will be important,” write authors retired Col. David Johnson, an adjunct scholar at the Modern War Institute at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, New York, and retired Lt. Gen. David Halverson, a former commander of the Army’s Fires Center of Excellence at Fort Sill, Oklahoma.

Keeping field artillery battalions in brigade combat teams “violates one of the fundamentals of fire support,” the authors argue, referring to the idea of never keeping artillery in reserve. A “clear advantage” of DIVARTY is that it will ensure all the fires that “can range the fight are available” to support maneuver commanders across an “extended battlefield,” they write. ★

## Transitions (continued)

**Mark Landes** from commanding general, Security Force Assistance Command, Fort Bragg, to commanding general, First Army Division East, Fort Knox.

**Edward Merrigan Jr.**, U.S. Army Reserve, from commander (Troop Program Unit), Great Lakes Training Division, 84th Training Command, Fort Sheridan, Ill., to deputy commanding general (Troop Program Unit), 84th Training Command, Fort Knox.

**Jonathan Moyer**, U.S. Army Reserve, from chief of staff (Troop Program Unit), 353rd Civil Affairs Command, Staten Island, to deputy commanding general (Troop Program Unit), 335th Signal Command (Theater), East Point, Ga.

**Antonio Munera** from deputy commanding general, U.S. Army Cadet Command, Fort Knox, to commanding general, 20th Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, Explosives Command, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md.

**Frederick O'Donnell** from deputy commanding general (Operations), 82nd Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, deployed to Operation Phantom Aegis, Kuwait, to deputy director, Operations, National Joint Operations Intelligence Center, Operations Team One, J3, Joint Staff, Washington, D.C.

**Andrew Preston** from deputy chief of staff, G-3/5/7, U.S. Army Pacific, Fort Shafter, to chief of staff, U.S. Army Pacific, Fort Shafter.

**William Ryan III** from chief of staff, I Corps, Joint Base Lewis-McChord, to senior adviser to Ministry of Defense, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, Operation Freedom's Sentinel, Afghanistan.

**Michelle Schmidt** from deputy commanding general (Support), 10th Mountain Division (Light), Fort Drum, N.Y., to deputy chief of staff, Intelligence, Resolute Support Mission, NATO; and director, J2, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, Operation Freedom's Sentinel, Afghanistan.

**Douglas Sims II (P)** from deputy director for regional operations and force management, J35, Joint Staff, Washington, D.C., to commanding general, 1st Infantry Division and Fort Riley, Kan.

**Thomas Tickner** from commanding general, U.S.

Army Corps of Engineers, Pacific Ocean Division, Fort Shafter, to commanding general, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, North Atlantic Division, Brooklyn.

**John Weidner** from director, U.S. Army Nuclear and Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Agency, Fort Belvoir, Va., to deputy director, Plans, J5, U.S. Strategic Command, Offutt Air Force Base, Neb.

*\*Assignments to general officer slots announced by the General Officer Management Office, Department of the Army. Some officers are listed at the grade to which they are nominated, promotable, or eligible to be frocked. The reporting dates for some officers may not yet be determined.*

### COMMAND SERGEANTS MAJOR AND SERGEANTS MAJOR CHANGES\*

**Command Sgt. Maj. Rebecca Booker** from U.S. Army Medical Department Activity, Fort Benning, Ga., to Regional Health Command-Atlantic, Fort Belvoir, Va.

**Command Sgt. Maj. Robert Cobb** from 1st Armored Division, Fort Bliss, Texas, to Eighth Army, Camp Humphreys, Korea.

**Sgt. Maj. Jody Hall** from Futures Team Directorate, U.S. Army Pacific Command, Fort Shafter, Hawaii, to Command Sgt. Maj., Special Operations Command-South, Homestead Air Reserve Base, Fla.

**Command Sgt. Maj. Darien Lawshea** from 35th Theater Tactical Signal Brigade, Fort Gordon, Ga., to U.S. Army Signal School, Fort Gordon.

**Sgt. Maj. Michael Lawson** from 175th Financial Management Support Center, Fort Shafter, to U.S. Army Pacific G-8, Fort Shafter.

**Sgt. Maj. Todd Shirley** from U.S. Army Forces Command G-1, Fort Bragg, N.C., to Command Sgt. Maj., NCO Leader Center of Excellence Deputy Commandant, Fort Bliss.

**Command Sgt. Maj. Tony Towns** from 1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, Fort Bliss, to U.S. Army Armor School, Fort Benning.

*\*Command sergeants major and sergeants major positions assigned to general officer commands.*

### SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE ANNOUNCEMENTS

Tier 2: **Ross Guckert** from deputy program executive officer, Soldier, Office of Program Executive Officer, Soldier, Fort Belvoir, Va., to program executive officer, Enterprise Information Systems, Office of Program Executive Officer, Enterprise Information Systems, Fort Belvoir.

**Michael Reheuser** from assistant G-1 for Civilian Personnel Policy, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-1, Washington, D.C., to director, Installation Services, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-9, Washington, D.C.

**Elizabeth Wilson** from deputy assistant secretary of the Army for marketing/director, Army Marketing and Research Group, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), Washington, D.C., to deputy assistant secretary of the Army for Defense Exports and Cooperation, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology), Washington, D.C.

Tier 3: **Daniel Klippstein** from director, Resource Integration, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-9, Washington, D.C., to assistant deputy chief of staff, G-9, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-9, Washington, D.C.

## Fatalities

The following U.S. Army soldiers died supporting military operations in May.

### Operation Freedom's Sentinel

Afghanistan: 1st Lt. Trevarius Ravon Bowman, 25

### Operation Inherent Resolve

Iraq: Sgt. Christopher Wesley Curry, 23

# Eyes on 'First Fight Goggle'

By **Scott Gourley**  
Contributing Editor

In written testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee this spring, the secretary of the Army and the chief of staff of the Army characterized the Army's new Integrated Visual Augmentation System as "progressing exceptionally well."

From its nontraditional industry partnerships to touch points where equipment lessons are learned during real-world soldier training, the Integrated Visual Augmentation System (IVAS) is seen by many as an archetype of the Army's new approach to increasing warfighter capabilities. IVAS goggles include thermal and low-light sensors as well as rapid target acquisition and identification, augmented reality and artificial intelligence capabilities.

According to Jason Regnier, technical director for Project Manager IVAS under Program Executive Office Soldier, over the past 70 years, approximately 4% of U.S. military forces have sustained 90% of the casualties; these were primarily dismounted infantry soldiers in close combat situations. He described IVAS as an effort to address that issue by increasing the lethality of those forces while simultaneously improving their situational awareness and survivability.

## Microsoft Partnership

"IVAS integrates new technology thermal and low-light sensors with rapid target acquisition capability into a base commercial augmented reality system—the Microsoft HoloLens," Regnier said. "That capability is then combined with networked communications, bringing information on friendly and enemy locations

Army leaders envision the Integrated Visual Augmentation System will improve soldiers' combat awareness and lethality.  
U.S. ARMY/LUKE ALLEN



and other situational awareness through the Army's integrated tactical network.

"This means the warfighter has superior vision and sensing capability as well as networked combat information overlaid on the see-through visor for a heads-up capability. Added to that is a suite of artificial intelligence software capability and the U.S. warfighters will regain the combat advantage in overall lethality."

"IVAS is a 'fight first goggle,'" said Maj. Brad Winn, IVAS action officer on the Army's Soldier Lethality Cross-Functional Team. Referring to its broad potential for additional uses, he said, "It has great capabilities, but first and foremost, it's a combat system. It is a rapid prototyping effort that supports a directive by former Secretary of Defense [Jim] Mattis to develop [heads-up display] and synthetic training environment capabilities to provide a single platform for soldiers to fight, rehearse and train, day and night, providing the increased lethality, mobility and situational awareness necessary to achieve overmatch against our current and future adversaries."

Elaborating on that theme, retired Command Sgt. Maj. Matt Walker, senior capabilities developer for the cross-functional team, said IVAS will

be where maps, overlays and other graphic representations of a common operational picture will come together in one piece of equipment.

## World's 'Best Fighting Goggle'

"It's the situational awareness tool for the soldier, providing their primary function at the tip of the spear," Walker said. "They can see other things first. Their ability to detect targets increases. They can engage targets more rapidly. It is the best fighting goggle in the world. Subsequent to that, the soldier will also have the ability to train and rehearse with IVAS. That's the 'order of march' that we talk about with this system: fight, train and rehearse."

IVAS' program genesis can be traced to Mattis, who designated it a priority program in 2017. Additionally, the 2018 National Defense Strategy alluded to the erosion of close combat capabilities relative to peer competitors, with current and future battlefields characterized by conditions that reduce comparative advantage, and the resulting need to anticipate new and emerging technologies. Moreover, Congress recognized the need and reprogrammed funds to get IVAS started in fiscal 2019, allowing the IVAS team to award multiple "other transaction agreements" to industry and kick off IVAS prior to this past Christmas.

## Next Modernization Step

According to Mark Stephens, acquisition and operations director for Project Manager IVAS, the Army's Enhanced Night Vision Goggle-Binocular (ENVG-B) provided the materiel foundation to quickly start the IVAS effort.

"ENVG-B was a high priority for [the] Soldier Lethality Cross-Functional Team," he said. "And one key point that the IVAS team learned was to involve soldiers by developing soldier touch points, combined with our vendor teammates on-site, to identify

and fix technology issues. Soldiers want improved mobility and lethality, which ENVG-B demonstrated. IVAS was the next modernization step after ENVG-B, known as HUD 3.0. Once [cross-functional teams] found that multiple requirements for the close combat force could be solved from a common materiel solution that was technically possible, and our Army laboratories concurred on the technical viability, IVAS was born.”

Winn characterized prime contractor Microsoft as “a phenomenal nontraditional partner” that shares the Army’s learning experiences with respect to planning, testing, rapid capability development, soldier experiences and feedback.

In addition to Microsoft, he pointed to more than a dozen awarded other transaction agreements across U.S. industry contributing cutting-edge technologies to the system.

The vendors exchange information to allow rapid integration of the latest technologies. The technologies are delivered and integrated through sequential capability sets that provide industry with an evolutionary, incremental approach that provides vendors with opportunities to discover and improve performance from soldier feedback.

Noting that the technologies and performance traits have evolved at every level over the past 18 months, Winn highlighted the capability set process as a primary evolutionary capability for Team IVAS.

“While the products seem revolutionary to our soldiers and how they could fight future battles, industry’s seamless approach works to make the system very intuitive for our users,” he said.

In addition to the strong industry support, program participants are quick to emphasize and credit the pivotal roles and support received across multiple cross-functional teams, several program executive offices, Army

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Gen. Mike Murray, U.S. Army Futures Command commander, tests the Integrated Visual Augmentation System. U.S. ARMY/LUKE ALLEN



depots and laboratories, and other service and DoD organizations.

### Soldier Feedback Adds Up

Working together, the team collected more than 20,000 hours of soldier feedback and conducted 25 test events over 19 months.

Winn said the program conducts monthly tests to gain soldier feedback, with plans to continue that methodology through the summer and fall. The next large-scale test is Soldier Touch Point 3. Currently slated for mid- to late October at Fort Pickett, Virginia, it will feature the first ruggedized military form of IVAS.

Some shifting of the program schedule might occur due to Army responses surrounding the coronavirus, with supply chain issues forcing programmatic shifts.

However, in addition to the program adjustments, the IVAS team’s response has included the repurposing of a prototype to fight the pandemic impact.

Specifically, in late April, an IVAS prototype was repurposed to rapidly assess the body temperatures of hundreds of soldiers preparing for training.

The concept has been credited to Tom Bowman, the director of the IVAS Science and Technology Special Project Office with the U.S. Army Combat Capabilities Development Command C5ISR Center’s Night Vision Laboratory at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. The C5ISR Center—C5ISR stands for Command,

Control, Communications, Computers, Cyber, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance—is one of the organizations that comprise the Army modernization enterprise, and is a partner to the Microsoft team that agreed to tweak software into an application that would expand the system’s capability.

### Fever Detector

Just days later, the first IVAS fever-detection devices were shipped to Fort Benning, Georgia, where the sensors were used to detect forehead and inner eye temperatures on hundreds of soldiers in minutes.

It was just one more example of demonstrated flexibility in IVAS.

COVID-19 complications aside, Soldier Touch Point 4, due in the early part of 2021, is expected to put IVAS to the test at the company level in a variety of combat scenarios to challenge system performance and network integration across multiple echelons.

Looking further into the future, Regnier said additional IVAS upgrades will be facilitated through its adaptive architecture and published commercial interfaces that will allow adaptation and upgrades throughout the system’s service life.

“A key example is the use of high-power computing on-body and a tactical cloud at the edge of the battlefield,” he said. “This allows for a host of future artificial intelligence and machine learning techniques to be added to enhance warfighter lethality and survivability.” ★

# Close-up on Camp Ashland, Nebraska



**Sitting along the banks of the Platte River in Nebraska, Camp Ashland proves that Army training sites can have both utility and beauty.**

Located between the state's largest cities, Lincoln and Omaha, the installation was established in 1906 and has been used by the Nebraska National Guard for more than 100 years.

The state, originally renting land from a farm, constructed ranges for targeting practice and conducted annual training on the site. The federal government bought the land in 1916.

Camp Ashland, which fell into disrepair after World War I, underwent renovations and opened again for training in 1923. During the 1930s, an octagonal concrete boxing arena was built. More than eight decades later, the arena is still used for large gatherings, such as change of command ceremonies and Basic Leader Course graduations.

Today, the Army National Guard installation is used primarily by soldiers—including active-duty, National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve—year-round and is supported by a staff of 130 personnel. The installation, which sees anywhere from 80,000–100,000 service members

every year, also hosts training events for the Air Force, Navy Reserve, Marine Corps and civilians.

Every month, roughly 200 active-duty and reserve component soldiers attend the Basic Leader Course at the camp.

Camp Ashland sits on 1,100 acres and consists of training space for land navigation, water crossings and small-unit tactics. The 209th Regiment (Regional Training Institute)—the installation's largest tenant—operates various schools on-site, including an NCO academy, officer candidate school and warrant officer candidate school.

According to the Nebraska National Guard, about 60% of the camp's training days are accounted for by the 209th Regiment, and the remaining 40% is made up by National Guard and Reserve units, ROTC and other agencies training on-site.

Camp Ashland, located in a flood plain, is in the process of repairing and rebuilding after experiencing historic flooding in 2019. Despite having flood protections in place, including a levee and flood-control barriers, the installation suffered extensive damage after the levee was breached.

In the wake of the disaster, Camp Ashland reduced its training and shifted operations to different sites for two months. Although training is back at the installation, its usual capacity will be restored once rebuilding is complete, Guard officials said.

Camp Ashland repaired and reinforced its levee and received \$62.3 million to replace unsalvageable buildings, according to the Guard. The camp's new buildings will match the square footage of modern buildings on-site and go up on stilts.

Earlier this year, Camp Ashland housed Americans in quarantine during the COVID-19 pandemic—all of whom had left by the end of February, officials said. As part of larger Army efforts to stop the spread of the coronavirus, the installation also moved the Basic Leader Course online so it could conduct classroom instruction through distance learning. —*Jennifer Benitz* ★

Camp Ashland's Memorial Hall sits along the Platte River in Nebraska. The historic structure is used for events such as ceremonies and graduations.

NEBRASKA NATIONAL GUARD/MAJ. SCOTT INGALSBE

# Envistacom LLC

**Founder and CEO:** Alyssa Carson

**President:** Alan Carson

**Headquarters:** 6 Concourse, Suite 550, Atlanta, GA 30328

**Website:** www.envistacom.com

Envistacom LLC is a privately held, Hispanic woman-owned small business headquartered in Atlanta. The company provides communications, cyber, intelligence operations and support services to U.S. and coalition partners in the aerospace, defense and intelligence communities. Envistacom focuses on equipping American warfighters with the right solutions and technology to counter existing and emerging threats, as well as protecting military personnel, civilians and critical infrastructure, with the goal of making the world a safer place.

Working primarily with DoD, Envistacom has over 300 employees in 11 countries and multiple indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity contracts worth over \$62 billion. Its workforce is comprised of over 50% military veterans. For three consecutive years, the company has been recognized as a top 10 "Pacesetter" and one of "Atlanta's Best Places to Work" by the *Atlanta Business Chronicle*, and as one of the top 10 fastest-growing companies in Georgia's upper-middle market by the Atlanta chapter of the Association for Corporate Growth. Earlier this year, the company was selected as one of the Top 40 Innovative Technology Companies in Georgia by the Technology Association of Georgia.

Alyssa and Alan Carson and a dedicated team of employees founded Envistacom in 2011. Their goal was to do it the right way from the start, laying the company's foundation with trust and putting employees first. This employee-first operating principle still guides all actions today and is the key to the company's success. The company's motto is "we take care of our employees so they can

Employees celebrate the grand opening of the Envistacom Innovation Center in Duluth, Georgia, near Atlanta.

ENVISTACOM LLC



take care of our customers."

As Envistacom continues to expand its global network, leadership is committed to achieving sustainable growth. This entails never losing sight of employees, hiring the best and brightest, maintaining trusted relationships, and delivering solutions-oriented work to achieve mission success. The company's Atlanta presence includes the Envistacom Innovation Center, a 30,000-square-foot facility that offers strategic support as an innovation and rapid-prototyping facility to develop solutions for customers across the DoD and global intelligence communities.

Within its communications solutions, Envistacom is bringing transport virtualization to the forefront of both government and commercial networks. These new capabilities will allow users to focus on how best to employ their networks without the need to focus on choosing the right hardware devices for their networks. Innovation, flexibility and employment of the fastest, most secure and most economical networks will be realized and result in an open and fair ecosystem for the benefit of users and technologists alike.

Envistacom in 2019 was issued three patents for satellite communications solutions, which build on the commercial industry's efforts for enhanced computer processing, data storage, security, etc., and add to Envistacom's expanding intellectual property portfolio.

The future of transport virtualization will ensure common off-the-shelf hardware will be widely utilized to host waveform and non-waveform applications in new ways. Waveforms and other applications will be operated independently or simultaneously from a single hardware platform to best serve a user's unique network needs, rather than multiple platforms that are proprietary.


Similar to cloud computing being a new paradigm in data processing and storage, transport virtualization is a new paradigm in communications enabling the delivery of data, video and voice over a heterogeneous virtualized transport medium. Analogous to the smartphone industry, instead of separately investing in a calculator, a phone, a flashlight, a camera and other purpose-built capabilities, users instead can invest in an infrastructure that delivers all capabilities.

# Dempsey Offers Personal Leadership Lessons

By Sgt. Maj. of the Army  
Kenneth Preston  
U.S. Army retired

**No Time for Spectators: The Lessons That Mattered Most From West Point to the West Wing** by retired Gen. Martin Dempsey, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is a collection of personal leadership lessons spanning a military career of more than four decades. This book is a compilation of short stories arranged in a format to support nine key leadership attributes. Each attribute is highlighted in various situations and circumstances, weaving in threads of interactions between leaders and subordinates to demonstrate limitations, expectations and lessons learned from the relationship.

Teaching points in the book are thoughtful and easily understood. Each of the short stories provides leadership lessons based on the author's experiences gathered throughout a successful and distinguished career. Dempsey is a strong character and a great storyteller with a natural ability to draw readers into the narrative. Those connected to military or government service will naturally be interested in the book, but teaching points in these stories are applicable



to any business or institution.

I appreciated the author's internal dialogue throughout the book as he engaged a variety of individuals, from the president of the United States and the secretary of defense, to senior and subordinate managers, to staff and junior employees. For

both current and aspiring leaders, getting inside the head of others and understanding their thought processes and reasoning is priceless. Even when dealing with mundane situations like budget reductions and resource allocation, Dempsey's candid thoughts and artful method of telling each story left me better informed and appreciative of the decision-making processes. Example by example, through dozens of short stories, the author's writing style is enjoyable and refreshing.

Leaders of all ages and situations will find great value in the book's underlying techniques for influencing human behavior and promoting self-development. As a young captain, Dempsey was assigned to be squadron maintenance officer for the 10th Cavalry. Like many units at the time, it had a poor maintenance record. Dempsey worked with a talented warrant officer to install a new program that focused on training, and tracked successes on a large billboard for all to see. The soldiers felt ownership in their roles and competed to be the most knowledgeable in their job—and the squadron passed annual inspection.

This type of organizational transformation set the stage for leader development at all levels of responsibility down to the operator level. Every organization needs to grow the next generation of leaders needed to replace outgoing management.

*No Time for Spectators* is both an enjoyable and a learning experience. The succinct anecdotal format, coupled with Dempsey's genuine spirit and humor, makes readers feel like they are there, in person, watching the story unfold.

As each story ends, readers will



Then-President Barack Obama greets Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Gen. Martin Dempsey at Dempsey's retirement ceremony in 2015.

DoD/PETTY OFFICER 2ND CLASS DOMINIQUE PINEIRO

long for the adventure of the next story and the gems of wisdom waiting in the pages ahead. From corporate executives to small-business owners to aspiring young managers with dreams of greatness, Dempsey shows why there is *No Time for*

*Spectators* in today's demanding and ever-changing global society.

**Sgt. Maj. of the Army Kenneth Preston**, U.S. Army retired, is a combat veteran who served as the 13th sergeant major of the Army. Since his retirement from the

Army in 2011, he has served on multiple executive boards and in several senior executive positions, including as vice president for NCO and Soldier Programs at the Association of the U.S. Army. He was with the association from 2013 through 2019 and is now an AUSA senior fellow.

## Put This Book in Your Toolkit as You Train

**By Lt. Col. Tim Stoy**  
U.S. Army retired


Retired Col. John Antal's *Infantry Combat—The Rifle Platoon: An Interactive Exercise in Small-Unit Tactics and Leadership* is a well-written book on small-unit leadership in combat.

*Infantry Combat* is an interactive, scenario-driven book. There is a basic and general introduction to the combat situation. Thereafter, readers find themselves jumping ahead and back based on decisions made by the book's protagonist, 2nd Lt. Bruce Davis, as well as actions taken by the enemy.

Decisions leading to mission failure result in a return to the point where the failure can be traced to an incorrect decision. Readers are then presented with the same set of options and decisions to make and follow the flow of combat again. Each decision, correct or incorrect, is evaluated based on one or more key principles of combat leadership.

As Gen. Dwight Eisenhower said, "The most terrible job in warfare is to be a second lieutenant leading a platoon when you are on the battlefield." In this case, Davis is a recently graduated West Point officer who has completed the officer basic course. Shortly after taking over a platoon, his light infantry battalion is deployed to a desert environment. There, he is to shore up an ally who is under attack from a capable enemy equipped with modern weapons and using Soviet doctrine.

His battalion is the first to arrive and will fight outnumbered to buy time for heavier units slated to arrive in theater. An unknown quantity,



Davis must establish his credibility and authority within his platoon and gain the confidence of his company commander, all while preparing to meet the enemy in mortal combat. The book follows Davis as he makes decisions from his arrival in the company through prebattle preparation to decisive combat.

I found the book's interactive nature, realistic scenario, interplay of personalities, acknowledgment that the enemy always has a vote, and the acknowledgment that future adversaries may have advanced weapons and effective doctrine useful in showing the complex leadership environment combat platoon leaders will

face. Although the scenario focuses on an infantry platoon, the book is accessible to noncombat arms branch officers and nonmilitary readers. Coupled with training at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California, this book would help prepare a lieutenant for success in combat.

This book should be in the toolkit of company, battalion and brigade commanders as they train platoon leaders for combat leadership. It will serve to remind them of their own duties and responsibilities vis-a-vis platoon leaders. Division commanders need to review this book to be reminded that, despite the combat multipliers and assets under their control, success rests on those platoon leaders effectively leading their platoons under trying conditions.

Finally, every American who cares about their country's national security needs to read this book to understand what is expected of junior military leaders. This includes all members of Congress—who are responsible for funding military training and equipping our military forces—and the commander in chief.

As demanding and bloody as our counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan over the past two decades have been, the possibility of engaging a more capable conventional adversary continues to grow. The Army must be ready. Antal's book would serve as an excellent tool in training the Army's combat platoon leaders for such a possibility.

**Lt. Col. Tim Stoy**, U.S. Army retired, served 31 years in the Army as an infantry and foreign area officer. He is now a military historian.

# First Volume of Trilogy Pinpoints Start of WWII

By Lt. Col. Robert Bateman  
U.S. Army retired


Historians generally avoid, even abhor, words like “always” and “never.” In fact, just about anything that smacks of the absolute sends us into spasms. One word particularly avoided is “magisterial.” (“Definitive” can be used, albeit with great caution.) So it is with trepidation that I use that word for the first time in decades of writing and reviewing history.

Richard Frank’s *Tower of Skulls: A History of the Asia-Pacific War, July 1937–May 1942* is the first of what promises to be a magisterial trilogy.

As the full title indicates, the scope of this first volume is limited in time. Four and three-quarter years may not seem like many, but what Frank is attempting is so broad that it is amazing he fit even that period into one book. Frank covers everything, from soup to nuts, in the Asia-Pacific Theater of World War II, which, as he notes, started in 1937 with the infamous Marco Polo Bridge Incident on July 7. What began as a random shot and a misreported missing man near this bridge outside Beijing escalated to a minor skirmish between Japanese and Chinese forces, and eventually to all-out war between the two countries.

This book brings in all the combatants in Asia, from the Chinese and Japanese, to the Dutch, Thais, Australians, French/Vietnamese, the Soviets and, of course, after the first 4½ years, the Americans. Further, this examination is not limited to one aspect or level of war. No, Frank attempts, and largely succeeds, to cover everything from politics (both foreign and domestic for each combatant) and culture to diplomacy, strategic planning, operational level events and even some tactical-level clashes.

Of course, as with any work of



**Tower of Skulls: A History of the Asia-Pacific War, July 1937–May 1942**

Richard Frank  
W.W. Norton & Co. 768 pages. \$40

this size and ambition, the book uses many secondary sources and some can be a bit dated. Given how long Frank must have been working on this book, that is understandable, but it does lead to a few gaffes. For example, Frank denigrates Japanese naval refueling abilities during the raid on Pearl Harbor. In this he echoes American authors who precede him. In fact, newer scholarship demonstrates that the Japanese were the world leaders in at-sea refueling. These quibbles aside, *Tower of Skulls*, as the first of three volumes, sets the bar high for the next two volumes and any author who follows.

*Tower of Skulls* fills a significant gap in the professional knowledge of many who deal with war history, in and out of uniform. Even those who generally consider World War II to be an area of specialty will learn new things here. The book makes clear how the scale and duration of events in the Far East exceed the most

## AUSA BOOKS

The AUSA Book Program offers quality books about Army heritage, military theory and policy, and security in the modern world.



### FEATURED TITLES

**Breaching the Summit: Leadership Lessons from the U.S. Military's Best**  
by Kenneth O. Preston, et al. (Casemate)

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common impression held by Americans (i.e., that the war started near the end of 1941) and places the role of China at the center of events. Even better, it provides cultural insights that explain the rise of Japan's cult of Bushido and how it played a role in the internal politics of Japan's military forces as well as how the

Japanese thought about and practiced war at every level, on land and at sea. This alone is well worth the price of the book.

Serious scholars and professionals in and out of uniform should read this book, which thoroughly fills a gap many have in the history of World War II.

**Lt. Col. Robert Bateman**, U.S. Army retired, served 25 years as an Army officer. He taught military history at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, New York; George Mason University, Virginia; and Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. He is the author of several books and is writing one about the interwar period.

## Drugs and Warfare Go Back a Long Way


By Michael Robbins

At dawn on Sept. 1, 1939, Germany launched a massive three-pronged attack on Poland to start World War II in Europe. With motorized units on the ground and waves of bombers in the sky, this combined arms invasion introduced a new and revolutionary doctrine of modern industrial warfare.

In subsequent German invasions of the Low Countries and France, this mechanized fighting style surprised and overwhelmed enemies with startling speed of movement. It was soon dubbed blitzkrieg, or "lightning war," though the Germans rarely used that term.

Germany's blitzkrieg was revolutionary in another, surprising, way. As historian Peter Andreas explains in his new book, *Killer High: A History of War in Six Drugs*, "part of the speed of the Blitzkrieg literally came from speed," that is, methamphetamines that energized German soldiers. "This was the first large-scale use of a synthetic performance-enhancing drug," Andreas notes. It was indeed large-scale: A German pharmaceutical company, Temmler-Werke, had begun marketing the newly synthesized methamphetamine under the brand name Pervitin in 1937.

It proved so effective in the Poland campaign that the company was soon producing nearly a million tablets a day. And during the invasion of France between May and the end of June 1940, German servicemen reportedly got more than 35



**Killer High: A History of War in Six Drugs**

*Peter Andreas*  
Oxford University Press. 352 pages.  
\$29.95

million Pervitin tablets.

The widespread use of amphetamines in World War II was novel, but the association of warfare and chemical stimulants and painkillers has a long history—which is the subject of this book. Warfare historically has been viewed through many optics, but rarely has anyone approached it systematically through the stories of the origins, exploitation, distribution and effects of these six psychoactive substances: alcohol, tobacco, caffeine, opium, amphetamines and cocaine.

Andreas focuses not only on the medical uses and abuses of these


substances across the ages and around the world, but also on their mostly natural origins and their profound social, economic and political impacts.

In one era or another, these substances were the causes of military conflicts and the rise and fall of empires. They have been big moneymakers for nations and for such corporate enterprises as the British East India Company—and have even underwritten the costs of many wars. And through centuries of warfare, these drugs have provided succor, comfort, energy and distraction for legions of individual combatants.

In discussing these drugs, Andreas shows a sharp eye for the telling anecdote and the pithy observation: "The tsar used vodka money to build up the largest army in Europe, but his soldiers were often too drunk to fight." On the American military experience in World War I, he quotes Gen. John Pershing, commander of the American Expeditionary Forces: "You ask me what we need to win this war. I answer tobacco as much as bullets. Tobacco is as indispensable as the daily ration."

Throughout, Andreas has thoroughly researched these many war/drug linkages, ancient and modern, and his findings will surprise many a reader. He is a stylish and engaging writer, and his is a fresh take on military history, and a refreshing read.

**Michael Robbins** is a former editor of *Military History* magazine and *MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History*.



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